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ABSTRACT: This Article explores sentencing of women convicted of
infanticide in Ireland in the middle years of the twentieth century,
demonstrating the link between lenient punishment of the offender and the
preservation of patriarchal norms, laws, and structures. Drawing on gender
construction theory and the concept of paternalism, it argues that merciful
punishment of this offender ultimately served the interests of the patriarchal
state-it denied the structural causes of offending, detracted attention from the
crime, and helped to legitimize the patriarchal structures, norms, and laws
contributed to women killing their babies in first place. Ultimately lenient
treatment of this offender helped the state retain control over all women,
particularly with regard to their reproductive autonomy. the article suggests
that criminal courts should openly countenance the role of structural causes of
infanticide at sentencing, leading to fairer punishment of offenders and also,
hopefully, help challenge underlining socio-political structural inequalities and
reduce crime.
INTRODUCTION ........................................... ........ 140
I. METHODOLOGY ....................................... ........ 144
II. PATRIARCHY AND THE IRISH STATE: PUTTING INFANTICIDE IN
CONTEXT ................ ............................. ...... 147
A. The Patriarchal State and the Unmarried Mother . ..... ...... 151
B. The Infanticide Law ..................... ......... 155
III. IRISH INFANTICIDE SENTENCING ........................... 157
IV. GENDER AND SENTENCING: GENDER CONSTRUCTIONS OF WOMEN
WHO KILL AND THE HARSH/LENIENT DEBATE ......... ............. 164
A. Gender Construction Unpicked-A Necessary Evil?.......... . . .. . .. . 171
V. PATERNALISM, PATRIARCHY, AND INFANTICIDE .................... 180
CONCLUSION...................................................... 185
Copyright C 2018 by the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
INTRODUCTION
Anne, a 20-year-old trainee nurse in England, became pregnant by a U.S.
serviceman who had returned to the States. When she visited her parents in
Ireland for her annual holiday, she knew she was pregnant and due to give
birth. On the day of the birth, she felt unwell and remained in bed, secretly
giving birth alone that evening in her bedroom. She admitted that she killed her
infant moments after the birth:
Immediately after the baby was born I baptized it. I did not know whether
it was a male or a female baby. I was not sure whether it was dead or alive. I
tied a small green ribbon around the baby's neck tightly and then wrapped it in
a kilt skirt and placed it in my large suitcase-a blue-grey fibre case-that was
in my bedroom. The baby did not scream.
Afterwards, she went to a stream behind her house where she washed
herself and rolled the afterbirth in some newspaper. She returned to bed and
remained there all night. When she got up the next morning, she collapsed on
the floor, and medical attention was sought. She was charged with murder but
at the preliminary hearing at the District Court the charge was reduced to
infanticide. She was convicted of infanticide at the Circuit Criminal Court. The
trial judge, stating that he 'felt sorry for her" but that he also had a "duty to
protect the public, " sentenced her to "six months imprisonment, suspended on
her entering into recognizances to be ofgood behaviorforfive years. "
This Article provides the first critical study of Irish judicial approaches to
sentencing women convicted under the Infanticide Act 1949.2 Through an
analysis of archival material, I will show that women convicted of infanticide, a
homicide offense carrying a maximum of life imprisonment, were given
exceptionally lenient sentences, with very few of these offenders being
imprisoned following conviction. The offenders in this study were all convicted
and sentenced between 1950 and 1975, at a time when Ireland was a deeply
conservative and patriarchal society, and where there were harsh and restrictive
attitudes to female sexuality, and particularly to unmarried mothers. In this
t Dr. Karen Brennan is a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Essex. She expresses her
gratitude to Professors Sabine Michalowski, Loma Fox-O'Mahony, and David O'Mahony, and the
editors of the Yale Journal of Law & Feminism for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this work.
1. National Archives of Ireland, State File Circuit Criminal Court, Anne G. (1959), IC/14/129 (Co.
Donegal, July 21, 1959); Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Siochina on Crime, Anne G.
(Co. Donegal 1959) at app. D, https://www.garda.ie/en/About-Us/Publications/Annual%2OReports
/An-Garda-Siochana-Annual-Reports/1959-Commissioner-s-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UKS-
MTES] (last visited May 9, 2018); Suspensory Sentence on St. Johnston Girl, DONEGAL
DEMOCRAT, July 31, 1959, at 6.
2. Infanticide Act 1949 (Act No. 16/1949) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1949/act/16
/enacted/en/html [https://perma.cc/S28Z-JHBD].
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wider context, the obvious question that arises when considering sentencing of
Irish infanticide offenders, such as Anne, is why women who killed their babies
received consistently lenient treatment at the hands of the courts?
To answer this question, I will first examine infanticide sentencing against
the existing feminist literature that demonstrates the role of gender
constructions in how women offenders are treated by the criminal justice
system. The literature reveals that some women offenders, including those who
commit violent crimes, are treated leniently by the courts, where they are
constructed as "good" within the patriarchal normative framework; others,
however-especially those who are taken to have broken patriarchal gender
norms-experience harsh treatment, being doubly punished for breaking both
the law and their gender role.3 Drawing on the good/bad analytical framework,
I will show that the Irish infanticide offender benefited from being constructed
as meeting the feminine ideal. Thus, one way of explaining lenient sentencing
of women who killed their babies is that it reflected patriarchal understandings
of women.
However, this is only part of the answer. Relying on the concept of
paternalism, I will show how sentencing practice in infanticide cases also had
the effect of serving patriarchal interests by helping to maintain patriarchal
laws and cultural values that placed women in a grossly unequal position in
Irish society, particularly with respect to their reproductive autonomy. I will
argue that extending "mercy" to the few who killed their babies helped the state
to retain control over all women and their reproductive choices. In this regard,
"leniency" is reconstructed as "paternalism," something that is more pernicious
because, while beneficial to the individual women who appeared before the
courts, it ultimately served the needs of the patriarchal state.
The role that sentencing plays in maintaining the patriarchal social order
has already been highlighted by Ballinger, who approaches this from a different
perspective, relying on the impact of gender constructions rather than the
concept of paternalism to demonstrate how punishment of women killers
reinforces and maintains heteropatriarchy.4 While not disputing the important
contribution of critiques of punishment based on gender constructions, in
particular how interpreting women offenders as "good" or "bad" can serve to
detract attention from the wider structural context and the causes of their
offending, I will discuss some limitations of this approach, including that these
3. See generally BELINDA MORRISSEY, WHEN WOMEN KILL: QUESTIONS OF AGENCY AND
SUBJECTIVITY (2003); ANNE WORRALL, OFFENDING WOMEN: FEMALE LAWBREAKERS AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1990); Irene Armstrong, Women and Their 'Uncontrollable
Impulses': The Medicalisation of Women's Crime and Diferential Gender Sentencing, 6
PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 67 (1999); Anette Ballinger, Masculinity in the Dock: Legal
Responses to Male Violence and Female Retaliation in England and Wales, 1900-1965, 16 SOC.
LEGAL STUD. 459 (2007).
4. Ballinger, supra note 3, at 475.
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arguments fail to acknowledge that the criminal law always individualizes
crime and does not take wider social circumstances into consideration.
Ultimately, both paternalism and gender construction reveal how
punishment of women, particularly where this is merciful and/or based on
gender constructions, can support patriarchy. The question that arises then is
whether compassionate5 treatment of the infanticide offender under the
infanticide law was problematic. For the women in this sample, the approach
taken was beneficial to them. However, given what this analysis of infanticide
sentencing reveals about the link between lenience and patriarchy, I will argue
that going forward, courts, in Ireland and in other jurisdictions, should do more
at sentencing to openly acknowledge the structural causes of crime, particularly
(in this context at least) gender inequality and the denial of reproductive
autonomy. In so doing, this would provide a more honest account of the
reasons for mitigation, and possibly help shift focus away from placing the
blame for infanticide solely on individual women and towards recognizing the
contribution of socio-political inequality to the offense. This would arguably do
more to improve women's rights and, as a consequence, help prevent
infanticide.
The Infanticide Act, and sentencing under it, is not just an example of how
the law and courts respond to crime in a gendered way. The analysis in this
Article also offers broader lessons with regard to how the criminal law deals
with the question of responsibility in cases where wider social, economic,
and/or political inequalities play an important part in the commission of the
offense, and where, as a result, a lenient criminal sanction is sought. In this
regard, the infanticide example highlights the difficulties that can arise through
the law's insistence on individual responsibility and its refusal to engage with
the socio-political context of criminal offending.6 It demonstrates an instance
of the law's attempt to show compassion without departing from its
requirement for individual responsibility. However, it also reveals how
compassion is linked to the preservation of the problematic socio-political
structures that contributed to the crime in the first place, and raises questions
about the role and the ability of the criminal law and courts to address issues of
social inequality where this is linked to the offending behavior in question. In
this regard, I argue that a change in how the criminal law understands and
punishes offenders is necessary, and that more should be done to take account
of the structural causes of criminal offending in order to fairly punish offenders
and prevent future crimes.
5. In this article, "compassion" is used as a synonym for sympathy, pity, mercy, and lenience, though
I understand that a finer analysis of these concepts shows key differences among them.
6. See ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL
LAw9-29, 304-332 (2d ed. 2001).
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The Infanticide Act, under which the women in this sample were
sentenced, is a specifically gendered law, first because it applies only to
women, and second because it allows for differential treatment on the basis of a
female-only experience-birth or lactation. My previous work on the Irish
infanticide law and its implementation in the courts has explored the
background to the infanticide reform, including the role of humanitarian
sentiment in the enactment of this law,7 and the importance of social norms in
the statute's creation and how it was subsequently implemented by the courts.8
In a previous article, I also explored the role of pragmatic and ideological
(gendered) considerations in how women convicted of infanticide-related
offenses were treated prior to the enactment of the 1949 law, particularly with
regard to the use of religious institutions as an alternative to imprisonment.9
While this earlier body of work has touched on the gendered aspect of the
criminal justice and legislative response to women who killed their babies, it
has not explored this issue in detail. More importantly, sentencing of women
under the 1949 statute has not been previously explored. This Article,
therefore, develops my previous work by providing an explicitly gendered
perspective on the criminal justice response to infanticide. It focuses
particularly on the issue of sentencing, demonstrating how the criminal justice
response to infanticide, both in terms of the how the legislative framework and
sentencing practice under this, served patriarchal interests.
This Article is broken into five sections. Section I outlines the
methodology for this research, which explores sentencing in cases of women
convicted of infanticide in Ireland, focusing on the period 1950 to 1975.
Section II outlines the role of patriarchal values, laws, and structures in the
crime of infanticide, and the context in which the Infanticide Act of 1949,
under which the women in this sample were sentenced, was enacted. This
Section will argue that infanticide, which was overwhelmingly committed by
unmarried women, was inextricably linked to patriarchal values and laws that
denied women reproductive autonomy, not only in choosing to prevent or end
pregnancy, but also in their ability to be mothers outside of marriage.
Section III presents original research data on the sentencing of women
convicted of infanticide under the Infanticide Act 1949, during the period 1950
to 1975, demonstrating the lenient approach that was taken to these offenders.
7. Karen M. Brennan, 'A Fine Mixture of Pity and Justice:' The Criminal Justice Response to
Infanticide in Ireland 1922-1949, 31 LAW & HIST. REv. 793 (2013) (arguing that the motivations
for adopting the infanticide law in Ireland were primarily pragmatic, but that sympathy for women
who killed their newborn illegitimate babies was also a significant motivating factor).
8. Karen Brennan, Social Norms and the Law in Responding to Infanticide, 38 LEGAL STUD. 480
(2018) (arguing that the criminal justice response to infanticide in Ireland, both before and after
the enactment of the Infanticide Act 1949, was informed primarily by social rather than legal
norms).
9. Karen Brennan, Punishing Infanticide in the Irish Free State, 3 IRISH J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2013).
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Lenient sentencing of women convicted of killing their babies, which saw very
few imprisoned, seems at odds with the prevailing patriarchal framework, and
in Sections IV and V, this is explained through two different theories: gender
construction and paternalism.
Section IV critiques the approach taken to punishing women for infanticide
by utilizing gender construction theory. This theory shows how infanticidal
women were constructed according to stereotypical gender norms, and how this
facilitated lenient punishment. The negative consequences of such
constructions, namely denial of the offender's agency and the structural causes
of her crime, are explored. Some limitations of this theory are noted, including
its failure to take account of the wider context of how the entire criminal law is
based on a false construct, that of the abstract rational man, and, as such,
always functions to exclude the socio-political causes of crime in the allocation
of criminal responsibility and punishment of offenders. In this regard, this
Section will argue that that the treatment of infanticide offenders was a
compromise of sorts, involving some contextualization of their crime with
minimal criminalization.
Section V considers the punishment of infanticide offenders by utilizing
the concept of "paternalism." This also highlights the link between lenient
punishment of infanticide offenders and the preservation of patriarchal
structures. Paternalism shows how mercy functioned on a systematic level to
maintain the existing status quo with regard to women's inequality, particularly
in relation to their reproductive choices.
Finally, drawing on insights from the preceding analyses on gender
construction, criminal law theory, and paternalism, I argue that courts, whether
in Ireland or elsewhere, should do more to openly countenance the structural
factors at play when faced with women who kill their babies. Hopefully, this
would help to break down patriarchal norms, values, and laws that contribute to
this crime, providing women with greater choices in relation to motherhood,
and ultimately reducing infanticide.
I. METHODOLOGY
This study focuses on those sentenced under the Infanticide Act, 1949. It is
based on information available in official criminal records and newspaper
articles, covering the period 1950 to 2015. The primary source relied on is the
annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda SiochAna on Crime (RCGSC),
1950 to 2005.10 From 2006, the Central Statistics Office (CSO) took over the
responsibility for recording criminal offenses, including information on the
10. Annual Reports of the Commissioner of the Garda Siochdna on Crime, https://www.garda.ie/en
/Information-Centre/Annual-Reports/[https://perma.cc/C9TX-N2YH] (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
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number of reported crimes, proceedings, and outcomes (but not sentences).
There were no infanticide convictions recorded between 2007 and 2015."
Focusing, therefore, on the period from 1950 to 2005, the RCGSC provides
information on the number of reported crimes, whether proceedings were
taken, and the outcome of proceedings (i.e., whether a conviction resulted).
Between 1951 and 1975, the RCGSC also included a summary of the
particulars of serious crimes, including the murder of infants and infanticide,
and further detail on the proceedings and their outcomes, including the
sentence imposed. From this record, seventy-five cases of "infanticide" and
"infant murder," the murder of persons aged under one year, were recorded
between 1950 and 2005.12 Criminal proceedings were taken in forty-two cases;
the remaining thirty-three cases were not subject to criminal prosecution. There
are some gaps in the information provided in the RCGSC, such as cases in
which the outcome of the proceedings and/or the gender of the accused was not
recorded.1 3 However, the records identify at least thirty-six cases where the
accused was disposed of under the Infanticide Act, 14 thirty-one of which (86
percent) resulted in a conviction for that offense.1 5
The thirty-one infanticide convictions noted in official records all took
place between 1950 and 1975. According to information in the RCGSC and
CSO sources, this comprises a complete, or almost complete, sample of those
convicted and sentenced under the infanticide statute since 1950. The last
recorded infanticide conviction and sentence noted in the records was in 1973.
Since then the incidence of this crime has fallen (only fifteen cases were
11. Central Statistics Office, CJA01, RECORDED CRIME OFFENCES BY TYPE OF OFFENCE AND YEAR,
http://www.cso.ie/px/pxeirestat/Statire/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?maintable=CJA0 1&PLanguage=
0 [https://perma.cc/L47P-UNRZ] (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
12. Between 1950 and 1996, murder was recorded as two separate categories-the murder of an infant
aged under one year, and the murder of persons aged one year and over. There was also a separate
category of infanticide. Since 1997, murder has been recorded as one category-there is not a
separate category for the murder of infants.
13. For example, there are three cases in the records-1977, 1978, and 1980-involving proceedings
against a person for the murder of an infant where the outcome is not recorded and where a
conviction/sentence under the 1949 law may have resulted.
14. Cases were either disposed of on indictment at the Central Criminal Court (the highest court of
criminal jurisdiction) or Circuit Criminal Court, or by summary disposition at the District Court.
Section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1951 (Act No. 2/1951) (Ir.) made provision for persons
appearing at the district court for preliminary examination of an indictable offense (except an
offense under the Treason Act of 1939, Act No. 10/1939 (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli
/1939/act/10/enacted/en/html [https://perma.cc/N8YR-DFU6]), including murder, attempt to
murder, conspiracy to murder and piracy, and any offense by an accessory before or after the fact,
to be tried summarily with the consent of the Attorney General. Section 13 of the Criminal Justice
Act 1967 (Act No. 12/1967) (Ir.) made similar provision. For further information on how these
cases were processed through the courts, prior to sentencing, see Brennan, Social Norms and the
Law in Responding to Infanticide, supra note 8.
15. Five of these cases were disposed of summarily at the District Court, and technically in one of
these cases the infanticide law was applied "without conviction." However, because the offender
was given a sentence, I have classified this, for ease of analysis, as a "conviction."
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recorded between 1975 and 2015), and very few proceedings have been taken
in the few cases that have come to the attention of the authorities over the last
four decades. It appears that no woman has been prosecuted for the
murder/infanticide of her baby since 1984.16
The second key source consulted were the State Books for the Central and
Circuit Criminal Courts (SBCCC and SBCrtCC, respectively).17 These court
records are held at the National Archives of Ireland (NAI) and provide an index
to all criminal cases appearing for trial on indictment at either court. The record
includes information on the outcomes of the proceedings and sentences; as the
official court record, it is likely the most reliable source for sentencing
information. Unfortunately, however, there are significant gaps in the
availability of these records at the NAI, particularly from the 1960s onwards,
and at the circuit court level. As a result, I was unable to rely on them as the
main source for sentencing information in this study. I was able to obtain a
state book record for only eleven cases in the sample.
The State Files for the Central and Circuit Criminal Courts were also
consulted (SFCCC and SFCrtCC, respectively). This record does not provide
information on the outcome of criminal proceedings or sentences, but it
contains witness depositions from the District Court and the accused's Garda
statement(s) at time of arrest, which allows for information on the
circumstances of the crime to be pieced together. Again, there was limited
access to these records, and I found state files for fifteen of the thirty cases
disposed of on indictment under the 1949 law (which also includes cases in
which the accused was acquitted). There is no state book or state file record for
cases involving a summary disposal at the District Court; five offenders (out of
thirty-one) were sentenced at the District Court following a summary
disposal.18
Finally, I also conducted a search of the Irish Newspaper archives database
for national and local newspaper reports on infanticide cases between 1950 and
1975. There was, however, limited reporting of these cases in both the local
16. For further discussion, see Brennan, Social Norms and the Law in Responding to Infanticide,
supra note 8 (exploring the possible reasons for the apparent no prosecution policy that has been
adopted since the 1980s, including particularly the role of shifting social norms in terms of how
this crime is understood in a more liberal social context).
17. The Irish infanticide law operates as an alternative to a murder charge or conviction and precludes
prosecution for infanticide in the first instance. Instead, the prosecution is obliged to charge with
murder, and it is for a district justice to reduce this charge to infanticide at a preliminary hearing of
the evidence at the District Court. Thus, cases disposed of at the Circuit Criminal Court, the lower
court of criminal jurisdiction for cases heard on indictment, were those where the murder charge
had been reduced to infanticide; those heard at the Central Criminal Court, the highest court of
criminal jurisdiction, were those where the accused was sent for trial for murder but where the
accused had a plea of guilty to infanticide accepted or was convicted by the jury of infanticide
under the Infanticide Act of 1949 § 1 (Act No. 16/1949) (Ir.).
18. See supra note 15.
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and national media. For example, even where the initial district court
appearance was reported, little information was provided on those proceedings,
and there was usually no follow-up report on the subsequent trial or sentence.
However, newspaper reports that covered the sentence imposed were
incorporated into the data where possible.
From the above sources, I was able to obtain sentencing information for
twenty-nine of the thirty-one infanticide convictions I identified in the records.
The RCGSC provides information on sentencing for twenty-eight of these
cases and, in that respect, was the primary source of information. However, a
note of caution is necessary. Although the main aspect of the sentence (i.e.,
whether it was custodial, suspended, non-custodial) was accurately reflected in
the report, it became apparent when other sources were consulted, particularly
the SBCCC/SBCrtCC, that the RCGSC did not always include all of the
requirements that had been incorporated in the final disposal. For example, that
the accused was required to reside with her parents for a specified period, or at
a convent, or that she had to undergo medical treatment, was not mentioned in
some cases whbre the SBCCC/SBCrtCC or a newspaper report mentioned this
additional requirement. Where possible, information provided in the RCGSC
was verified through the SBCCC/SBCrtCC and newspaper reports. However,
there were eleven cases in the study where the RCGSC was the only source of
information on sentencing, and it is possible that in some of these cases
additional requirements were imposed on the offender that were not recorded in
that report. Nonetheless, the RCGSC provides a sufficiently good indication of
the general sentence.
II. PATRIARCHY AND THE IRISH STATE: PUTTING INFANTICIDE IN CONTEXT
I have argued elsewhere that it is crucial to take account of the wider social
context and related social norms in the legal response to infanticide, both
before and after the enactment of the Infanticide Act of 1949.19 It is also
important to acknowledge the role of the gendered social order in contributing
to this crime. The typical infanticide case involved an unmarried woman who
had killed her baby at or soon after a concealed birth. 20 The crime was
inextricably linked to illegitimacy, the inequitable position of women in
general, and the unmarried mother in particular in a patriarchal society.
The starting point for understanding twentieth-century Irish society is the
Great Famine of the mid-nineteenth century, the devastating impact of which
19. Brennan, Social Norms and the Law in Responding to Infanticide, supra note 8.
20. See generally CLIONA RATTIGAN, 'WHAT ELSE COULD I Do?': SINGLE MOTHERS AND
INFANTICIDE, IRELAND 1900-1950 35-74 (2012) (providing an overview of the profile and
circumstances of the typical infanticide offender in twentieth-century Ireland).
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had a significant and enduring effect on Irish social life. One of the lessons
learned in the aftermath of the Famine was that subdivision of farming land
was not economically viable. Middle-class farming interests, therefore,
required a patrilineal system of inheritance, with only one son standing to
inherit; the supervision and regulation of marriage arrangements; the operation
of a dowry system; and a strict injunction on non-marital sexual relationships.
Within this system, female chastity was of crucial importance. These values
were disseminated to the remainder of society through the teachings of the
Catholic Church.21
The social and economic changes heralded by the Famine were especially
damaging to the status of women in Irish society. Rhodes has argued that the
substantial importance which was accorded to land, and the associated societal,
familial, and economic changes that occurred as a result of this, contributed to
Ireland's emergence as a patriarchal society.22 Rhodes notes, "As the social
composition of Ireland changed in favor of farmers and as land became the
distinguishing criterion for status, the position of women declined."23 A
reduction in female employment opportunities in agriculture and related areas
significantly reduced the economic power and independence of many women,
which further damaged their position in the family and in society.24 The
changes that occurred in the aftermath of the famine, particularly the
predominance of middle-class farmer values, the resultant emergence of the
patriarchal family, and the decline in employment opportunities for women,
had a long-lasting, negative impact on the economic and social status of all
women.
21. See generally TOM INGLIS, TRUTH, POWER AND LIES: IRISH SOCIETY AND THE CASE OF THE
KERRY BABIES 133-34 (2003) (summarizing the impact of farming requirements to not subdivide
holdings on marriage and sexuality in Ireland, including the injunction on pre-marital sex and the
impact of this on attitudes to unmarried mothers, as well as the role of the Church in providing the
moral framework for this regulation); JOSEPH J. LEE, Women and the Church Since the Famine, in
WOMEN IN IRISH SOCIETY: THE HISTORICAL DIMENSION 37-45 (Margaret Mac Curtain &
Donnacha O'Corrain eds. 1978) (providing an overview of the social and economic changes that
were dictated by middle-class farming interests post-Famine, including the significant emphasis
placed on chastity outside of marriage and the regulation of marriage matches, the impact of these
changes on women, and the role of the Catholic Church in endorsing and promulgating these new
mores, particularly with regard to the importance of chastity outside of marriage); RITA M.
RHODES, WOMEN AND FAMILY IN POST FAMINE IRELAND: STATUS AND OPPORTUNITY IN A
PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 51-88 (1992) (offering an account of how Ireland became a patriarchal
society as a consequence of the increasing importance placed on land and its association with the
family post-Famine, the impact of this change on the roles of men and women within the family,
and, as a consequence, the impact on the status of women).
22. RHODES, supra note 21, at 51-88.
23. Id. at 85.
24. LEE, supra note 21, at 37-38. See also Caitriona Clear, 'Too Fond of Going': Female Emigration
and Change for Women in Ireland, 1946-1961, in THE LOST DECADE: IRELAND IN THE 1950s 135-
46, 136-41 (Dermot Keogh et al. eds. 2004) (providing an overview of female occupations and
areas of employment in the 1920s-1 960s).
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Patriarchal values and interests were consolidated in the state and its laws
following independence from Britain in 1922. In the nation-building era of the
nascent Irish state, a state gender ideology developed, supported by the
increasingly influential Irish Catholic hierarchy, which cast women in a crucial
symbolic role.2 5 The largely male, nationalist, and Catholic government
embarked on a policy and legislative agenda imbued with patriarchal and
Catholic ideology, which sought to create an "Irish" identity separate from and
different to the "British" identity.26 In this regard, the sexual purity of the
nation, in particular that of its women, was identified as key to the identity and
survival of the newly independent state. 2 7 As Luddy has argued, during this
period, "the female body and the maternal body, particularly in its unmarried
condition, became a central focus of concern to the state and the Catholic
Church."2 8
The Catholic Church held an especially influential position in the Irish
state apparatus.29 Indeed, it seems that the Catholic Church may have
considered that independence from the Crown provided it with an
25. See generally LOUISE RYAN, GENDER, IDENTITY AND THE IRISH PRESS, 1922-1937: EMBODYING
THE NATION 257-59 (2002) (discussing the ways in which women were represented through
Catholic, nationalist ideology as having the power to both undermine (through her impurity) and
safeguard (though her purity) the new "Irish" nation, and. how the control of women, particularly
with regard to their sexuality, became ideologically entwined with the success of the nationalist
project); Maryann Valiulis, Neither Feminist Nor Flapper: The Ecclesiastical Construction of the
Ideal Irish Woman, in CHATTEL, SERVANT OR CITIZEN: WOMEN'S STATUS IN CHURCH, STATE
AND SOCIETY 168-78 (Mary O'Dowd & Sabine Wichert eds. 1995) (examining the characteristics
of the ideal Irish woman as defined by state and church ideology, and the importance of this for
Irish society, particularly with regard to how women were defined as mothers and wives, and the
resulting restrictions placed on them; arguing that the church served to provide moral justification
for a variety of government policies that placed restrictions on women); Maria Luddy, Sex and the
Single Girl in 1920s and 1930s Ireland, 35 IRISH REV. 79, 80-81 (2007) (discussing the role of
women in Irish society as wives and mothers, and related state and church anxiety over the
unmarried mother, as well as consequent efforts to implement changes to prevent illegitimacy and
control women); Maryann G. Valiulis, Power, Gender, and Identity in the Irish Free State, 6-7 J.
OF WOMEN'S HIST. 117 (1995) (examining how the Irish government following independence
sought to relegate women to the private sphere, despite them having played a key public role in the
fight for independence, and how this relegation embodied a gender ideology which linked the
domestic role of women to the stability, identity, and moral superiority of the "Irish" nation;
because it coincided with Catholic teachings and middle-class farming interests, this gender
ideology became embedded in Irish society).
26. See supra note 25. See also JOHN HENRY WHYTE, CHURCH AND STATE IN MODERN IRELAND:
1923-1979 24-64 (1980) (providing an overview of the State's adoption of the Catholic moral
code into Irish legislation, and the tendency, particularly amongst one political party, to "equate
'Irish' and 'Catholic').
27. See supra note 25.
28. MARIA LUDDY, PROSTITUTION AND IRISH SOCIETY, 1800-1940, at 194 (2007).
29. See generally WHYTE, supra note 26, at 24-64. For the Church's specific role in helping the State
promulgate, embed, and justify its gender ideology and related legislative and policy changes, see
CHRYSTEL HUG, THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL MORALITY IN IRELAND 77-78 (1999); LUDDY,
PROSTITUTION AND IRISH SOCIETY, supra note 28, at 194-97; Valiulis, Neither Feminist nor
Flapper, supra note 25; Luddy, Sex and the Single Girl in 1920s and 1930s Ireland, supra note 25,
at 80-81.
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unprecedented opportunity to influence governmental and legislative policy on
issues that touched on its teachings. As one contemporary Catholic
commentator asserted, "for the first time in centuries Irish Catholics have an
opportunity of fixing their own legal standard of public morality ... ."o He
added: "The Irish people have been ever remarkable for their high appreciation
of purity and chastity ... and there is now every probability of fixing the legal
standard of morality in true consonance with the ideals set before them by the
teaching of the Catholic Church." 31
It should be noted, however, that the state's preoccupation with morality
during the first two decades of independence was not strictly a consequence of
Church agitation on these issues; neither were the legal measures which
ensued, such as, for example, the prohibition on contraception in Section 17 of
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1935, necessarily instances of Irish
governments responding to pressure from Catholic bishops. The fact that many
civil servants and politicians were themselves practicing Catholics meant that
the Church's doctrines and values made their way into policy and legislation in
more subtle ways, because, during the early decades of Irish independence,
public officials naturally legislated in harmony with the Church's views.32 As
Whyte has noted, during the 1920s and 1930s there was "a remarkable
consensus" (without the need for any Church pressure) that Catholic moral
teachings should be preserved by the law.33 Many Irish politicians and other
officials did not distinguish the exercise of their private religious convictions
from the exercise of their public role, and, as .such, functioned in a manner
which was inherently Catholic.34 Those who did not feel bound by their
consciences to follow the Church's teachings in the performance of their
official duties were at least convinced of the political folly involved in
governing in a manner which would risk alienating a substantial portion of the
electorate or which could advantage the opposition.3 5  Further, Irish
governments sought to regulate public morals for political reasons as part of
30. Rev. R.S. Devane, S.J., The Unmarried Mother: Some Legal Aspects of the Problem, 23 IRISH
ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD 55-68, 57 (1924) (discussing setting a new age of consent for sexual
intercourse).
31. Id. at 58.
32. TOM INGLIS, MORAL MONOPOLY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN MODERN
IRELAND 77 (1998); WHYTE, supra note 26, at 24-64.
33. WHYTE, supra note 26, at 60.
34. DIARMAID FERRITER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF IRELAND 1900-2000, at 337 (2004).
35. INGLIS, supra note 32, at 79; WHYTE, supra note 26, at 368. According to the 1946 Census, over
ninety percent of the Irish populace was Roman Catholic. See CSO, 3 CENSUS OF THE
POPULATION OF IRELAND, 1946 at 13 tbl.9, http://www.cso.ie/census/census_1946results
/Volume3/C%201946%20V3%20EntireVol.pdf [https://perma.cc/3L4B-8SUG] (last visited Apr.
11,2018).
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their efforts to construct a stable nation in the aftermath of the violent struggle
for independence and the consequent civil war.36
Thus, while the Catholic hierarchy did not necessarily dictate government
policy and law, Irish political life was imbued with Catholic thought, and the
hierarchy was regularly consulted on issues touching on its moral and social
teachings. At times its views were pivotal in government decisions.
Government plans to introduce free healthcare for mothers and children aged
under sixteen (the Mother and Child Scheme), 37 for example, were met with
entrenched opposition from the Catholic hierarchy, which saw the scheme as an
infringement on the family and as potentially usurping Catholic teachings on
contraception. The controversy led to the government abandoning this policy
and the resignation of the Minister for Health, who had proposed the reform.3 8
My research on the background to the enactment of the Infanticide Act 1949
reveals that the Archbishop of Dublin was approached before the bill was
presented to Parliament, and that following this consultation, a new clause was
added to the bill to address sanctity of human life concerns by reinforcing the
point that the killing of a baby should first and foremost be considered murder.
Interestingly, however, it appears that the Archbishop did not outright reject the
planned reform.39
A. The Patriarchal State and the Unmarried Mother
Women's role within the post-independence Irish gender order was to be
domestic and pure. 4 0 They were expected to be mothers, but only within the
married family; otherwise, they were to remain as chaste unmarried sisters and
36. See supra note 25.
37. The Health Act of 1947 had made provision for health authorities to make arrangements in relation
to the health of women and children, including, in section 21, safeguarding the health of women in
relation to motherhood and for their education in that respect. Health Act 1947, Part III (Act No.
28/1947) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1947/act/28/enacted/en/html [https://perma.cc
/8WU5-YPBF] (last visited May 15, 2018). Following a general election which saw a change in
government, the new Minister for Health introduced his draft proposals for a new scheme for
healthcare for mothers and children in 1950, as he was empowered to do under the 1947
legislation. WHYTE, supra note 26, at 202 n.26 (citing Proposals for a Mother and Child Health
Service Under Part III of the Health Act 1947, DEP'T OF HEALTH (IR.)). For a summary of the
affair, see also Ireland Through the Decades: 1950s, HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS, http://www
.oireachtas.ie/parliament/about/libraryresearchservice/onlinecataloguecollections/documentslaid
throughthedecades/1950s-motherandchildscheme/ [https://perma.cc/RS5T-ZG9R] (last visited
May 15, 2018).
38. See generally WHYTE, supra note 26, at 201-38 (discussing the controversy surrounding the
proposed scheme, especially the clash that resulted between the Minister for Health and the
Catholic Hierarchy, and the circumstances of his resignation).
39. Karen Brennan, 'Traditions of English Liberal Thought:' A History of the Enactment of an
Infanticide Law in Ireland, 50 IRISH JURIST 100, 117-20 (2013).
40. See supra note 25 (two citations to Valiulis).
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daughters. As Earner-Byrne notes: "In the Irish 'social order' the concept of
illegitimacy extended in practice, if not in name, to the unmarried mother: she
was an illegitimate mother. The status of motherhood was legitimated by
marriage." 4 1 Unmarried mothers, already culturally condemned, attracted
particular official attention from the state and church, and there was much
discussion of what should be done about these problematic women.4 2 Although
the idea of compulsory state-imposed confinement within religious-run
institutions, such as Magdalene laundries, was touted, and was evidently
considered by some to provide a suitable solution, this was never officially
endorsed via legislation allowing for compulsory confinement of unmarried
mothers.4 3 However, the reality was that many pregnant girls and women had
to rely on religious institutions, including Magdalene laundries and mother-
and-baby homes, for support. Essentially, the state and wider society tacitly
supported what was effectively a de facto system of detention of many
unmarried mothers, at least for those who were unsupported by family or
unable to provide for themselves and their baby by other means. 4 4 Indeed, some
women were sent to these institutions by their families.45 The rationales for
effectively detaining unmarried mothers in institutions were: prevention,
41. LINDSEY EARNER-BYRNE, MOTHER AND CHILD: MATERNITY AND CHILD WELFARE IN DUBLIN,
1922-1960 172 (2007).
42. LUDDY, PROSTITUTION AND IRISH SOCIETY, supra note 28 at 194-97, 200-03; Louise Ryan, Irish
Newspaper Representations of Women, Migration and Pregnancy outside Marriage in the 1930s,
in SINGLE MOTHERHOOD IN TWENTIETH CENTURY IRELAND: CULTURAL, HISTORICAL AND
SOCIAL ESSAYS 103, 105-06 (Maria Cinta Ramblado-Minero & Auxiliadora Pdrez-Vides eds.
2006); RYAN, supra note 25 at 257-60; Luddy, Sex and the Single Girl in 1920s and 1930s
Ireland, supra note 25 at 79-91; Valiulis, Neither Feminist Nor Flapper, supra note 25.
43. EARNER-BYRNE, supra note 41 at 182-90 (discussing use of religious-run institutions to deal with
unmarried mothers); LUDDY, PROSTITUTION AND IRISH SOCIETY, supra note 28 at 117-23, 201-
203, 235-37 (discussing policy around use of Magdalene laundries and other institutions to deal
with unmarried mothers); Carla Fischer, Gender, National and the Politics of Shame: Magdalen
Laundries and the Institutionalisation of Feminine Transgression in Modern Ireland, 41 SIGNS
821, 825-32 (2016) (exploring the role of shame in pathologizing and institutionalizing women in
Ireland post-independence as part of national identity formation); Paul M. Garrett, "Unmarried
Mothers" in the Republic oflreland, 16 J. Soc. WORK 709 (2016) (discussing policy and practice
in relation to unmarried mothers in Ireland post-Independence, including the establishment of
quasi-penal Mother and Baby Homes).
44. EARNER-BYRNE, supra note 41 at 182-90; LUDDY, PROSTITUTION AND IRISH SOCIETY, supra note
28 at 117-23, 201-03, 235-37.
45. There is no access to official records on how women entered these institutions, so we do not have
certainty on how pregnant women ended up in mother and baby homes and similar establishments,
although undoubtedly families played an important role. The McAleese report on the state's
involvement in Magdalene asylums found that 10.5 percent of women who entered these particular
institutions had been left there by their families. Admittedly, these were not pregnant women, but
the figure is indicative of family willingness to send their female relatives to convents. See DEP'T
OF JUSTICE (IR.), REPORT OF THE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITrEE TO ESTABLISH THE FACTS
OF STATE INVOLVEMENT WITH MAGDALEN LAUNDRIES 854-924 (2013), http://www.justice.ie/en
/JELR/2013MagdalenP%201V%2OChapter%20 18%2ONon%20State%20Routes%20(PDF%20-%2
0347KB).pdf/Files/2013Magdalen-P%201V%20Chapter%201 8%2ONon%2OState%2ORoutes%20(
PDF%20-%20347KB).pdf [https://perma.cc/CFH5-DGJB] (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
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redemption, and containment.46 As Fischer has noted, "the fledging Irish
nation-state required the hiding of those bringing national shame through
sexual immorality in a system of mass incarceration." 47
When it is said that the Irish state was patriarchal, this is not to suggest that
there was a rigid and coherent form of gender oppression whereby men as a
group used the state as an instrument of male domination such that male
interests were always oppositional to those of women, and that male interests
always prevailed. The reality is of course more nuanced than that. Indeed,
Connell rejects the idea that the state is a vehicle for male domination of
women, arguing that it is the state itself that is patriarchal; patriarchy is
embedded in the state's processes and procedures. 4 8 In this sense, patriarchy is
institutionalized in how the state functions, rather than residing in the hands of
individual men. One aspect of this is the state's ability to regulate gender
relations in other institutions, such as marriage 4 9; another element is that gender
is a "major realm of state policy" with the state having far-reaching powers,
through its law, policies, and procedures to have an impact in gender politics
and the concrete experience of individuals in this regard, such as, for example,
in areas of housing, childcare, education, taxation, and healthcare.50
There are many examples of how patriarchy was embedded in the Irish
state, and how the consequences of the post-independence patriarchal gender
ideology had real practical impacts on women and their choices, particularly in
the area of reproductive autonomy. Women's sexuality was controlled through
both laws (such as those prohibiting contraception) and social norms (such as
the intense cultural stigmatization of the unmarried mother, which carried the
risk of confinement in a religious institution). In particular, they were denied
the opportunity to make autonomous choices about whether, when, and under
what circumstances they would become mothers. As Mullally has highlighted,
"women's reproductive autonomy was sacrificed to the greater good of the
post-colonial political project, and women were defined not by their equal
capacity for agency, but by their reproductive and sexual functions."51
Contraception was not legally available, due to a variety of prohibitions under
Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1935, which included a ban
46. EARNER-BYRNE, supra note 41, at 187, 189-90; LUDDY, PROSTITUTION AND IRISH SOCIETY,
supra note 28, at 117-19, 200-03.
47. Fischer, supra note 43, at 821.
48. See generally R.W. Connell, The State, Gender and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal, in
POWER/GENDER: SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 136, 142-46, 163 (H. Lorraine
Radtke & Henderikus J. Stam eds. 1994).
49. Id. at 155-57.
50. Id. at 159.
51. Siobhn Mullally, Debating Reproductive Rights in Ireland, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 78, 83 (2005).
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on the sale and importation of contraceptives. 5 2 This remained in place until the
1980s. 53  Abortion was a criminal offense, legally available only in
exceptionally limited circumstances.54 As already noted, women were
stigmatized when they became pregnant outside of marriage and faced potential
institutionalization. State financial support for unmarried mothers only became
available in the early 1970s,5s and cultural intolerance of unmarried mothers
only began to shift in the 1980s.56 Thus, unmarried mothers faced significant
52. Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1935 prohibited selling, exposing, offering,
advertising, or keeping for sale or importing or attempting to import for sale contraceptives. Act
No. 6/1935 (Ir.). For further discussion, see Sandra McAvoy, The Regulation of Sexuality in the
Irish Free State, 1929-1935, in MEDICINE, DISEASE AND THE STATE IN IRELAND, 1650-1940 253
(Greta Jones & Elizabeth Malcolm eds. 1999).
53. Restrictions were incrementally loosened from 1979 onwards. See, e.g., Health (Family Planning)
Act 1979 §§ 4, 5, 13 (Act No. 20/1979) (Ir.); Health (Family Planning) Amendment Act 1985 § 2
(Act No. 4/1984) (Ir.); Health (Family Planning) Amendment Act 1992 (Act No. 20/1992) (Ir.).
See generally Hug, supra note 29 at 86-91 (discussing the gradual liberalization of Irish laws on
contraception).
54. Abortion was criminalized prior to independence under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861,
24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, §§ 58, 59 (Eng.). This law continued to apply in Ireland after independence
from Britain in 1922. In 1983, the Irish public voted in a referendum to insert a new provision into
the Irish Constitution equating the life of the fetus, the "unborn," to the life of the pregnant
woman, thus curtailing any potential liberalization of Ireland's abortion law, as had occurred in
England and Wales in 1967 with the Abortion Act 1967 c. 87 and in the U.S. in the 1970s with
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). The Constitution of Ireland 1937, art. 40.3.3, provides (by
virtue of the Eighth Amendment): "The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and,
with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its law to respect, and, as far
as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right." This was interpreted by the Irish
Supreme Court to mean that abortion could only be available in situations involving a real and
substantial risk to the life (but not the health) of a pregnant woman, which included a risk of
suicide. Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 IR 1 (Ir.). In 2013, the Irish Parliament legislated to reflect
this constitutional provision, as interpreted by the "X case." Protection of Life During Pregnancy
Act 2013 (Act No. 35/2013) (Ir.). Abortions in cases falling outside the scope of the very narrow
exceptions provided for under this statute continue to be criminalized and punishable to a
maximum of 14 years' imprisonment. Id. § 22. For further detail, see Ivana Bacik, A History of
Abortion Law in Ireland and Prospects for Change, 20 MEDICo-LEGAL J. IR. 75 (2014). On May
25, 2018, Irish voters passed a referendum to repeal the Eighth Amendment. The significance of
this is that it enables the legislature to enact more liberal abortion laws. At the time of writing, the
2013 law remains in place, but it is expected that the government will soon bring forward
legislation which, if passed, will allow women significantly greater access to abortion within the
Irish state than they currently have. Draft legislation that was published by the government in the
lead-up to the referendum vote gives a good indication of the direction and scope of the future law.
See General Scheme of the Bill to Regulation Termination of Pregnancy, DEP'T OF HEALTH (IR.)
(Mar. 27, 2018), available at https://health.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/General-Scheme-
for-Publication.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5J9-M9Z7] (last visited June 4, 2018). The Irish
government is set to take forward their plans for liberalizing the current law this year. See Henry
McDonald et al., Ireland Moves Forward with Abortion Law Reform After Historic Vote,
GUARDIAN, May 27, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/27/ireland-to-start-
abortion-law-reform-after-historic-vote [https://perma.cc/3XCP-BPK4]. For further detail on the
background to this referendum, see infra note 175.
55. Social Welfare Act 1973 § 8 (Act No. 10/1973) (Ir.).
56. INGLIS, supra note 21, at 125-26, 143. The increased cultural acceptability of unmarried
motherhood is evidenced by statistics on births outside of marriage, which in 1950 accounted for
only three percent of all births, and in 2000 amounted for thirty-two percent of all births. See
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hardships, including stigmatization, unemployment, poverty, and rejection by
community and family. Double standards of sexuality meant that men were
largely unaccountable for their role.57 The crime of infanticide was closely
related to the difficulties faced by unmarried pregnant women-it was a crime
that was inextricably linked to gender inequality and, in particular, the effects
of patriarchal values, norms, and laws, which, until the latter decades of the
twentieth century, essentially barred sexually active women from both
preventing pregnancy and being mothers outside of marriage. It was in this
context that the Infanticide Act was enacted and subsequently applied.
B. The Infanticide Law
Following the English model of 1922/1938, the Irish legislature adopted a
statute specific to infanticide in 1949.58 The legislation allowed for a woman
who willfully killed an infant under the age of twelve months, under
circumstances that would have amounted to murder, and where the balance of
her mind was disturbed by the effect of childbirth or lactation, to be tried for, or
at a murder trial convicted of, "infanticide." 59 The maximum sentence was life
imprisonment.o
SHANE KILCOMMINS ET AL., CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER IN IRELAND 117
(2004).
57. Ryan, supra note 42, at 116-17.
58. Infanticide Act 1949 (Act No. 16/1949) (Ir.), following the English/Welsh Infanticide Act 1922,
12 & 13 Geo. 5 c. 18 (Eng.); Infanticide Act 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6 c. 36 (Eng.).
59. Infanticide Act 1949 § 1 (Act No. 16/1949) (Ir.). Infanticide was defined as follows: "A woman
shall be guilty of felony, namely infanticide if - (a) by any willful act or omission she causes the
death of her child, being a child under the age of 12 months, and (b) the circumstances are such
that, but for this section, the act or omission would have amounted to murder, and (c) at the time of
the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully
recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation
consequent upon the birth of the child ..... Infanticide Act 1949 § 1(3) (Act No. 16/1949) (Ir.).
The reference to the "effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child" has since been
replaced with a reference to a "mental disorder" within the meaning of the Criminal Law (Insanity)
Act 2006 § 22(a) (Act No. 11/2006).
Under § 1(1) of the 1949 statute, it was not possible to charge a woman with infanticide in the first
instance. Instead, she would be charged with murder by the prosecuting authorities and a district
justice, at the preliminary hearing of the murder charge at the District Court, had the authority to
reduce the charge to infanticide and send her for trial for that offense. When the accused was
forwarded on the reduced charge she would be tried as for manslaughter under § 1(3), which
meant that she would be tried at the Circuit Criminal Court, a court of lower criminal jurisdiction.
If the charge was not reduced and the accused was sent for trial for murder to the Central Criminal
Court, she would be convicted of infanticide by a jury under § 1(2), or the prosecution could
accept an infanticide guilty plea. For further discussion on how the Infanticide Act 1949 was
employed by the courts in processing cases of maternal infant murder, see Brennan, Social Norms
and the Law in Responding to Infanticide, supra note 8.
60. Section 1(3) of the Infanticide Act provided that infanticide would be punished the same as
manslaughter. Infanticide Act 1949 § 1(3) (Act No. 16/1949) (Ir.).
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This law was enacted at a time when murder was punished by a mandatory
death sentence, 61 and in the decades prior to the infanticide reform this had
caused significant problems in cases of maternal infant-murder, for it was
generally thought that women who killed their babies should not be subject to a
capital conviction.62 As a result, ad hoc practices developed to avoid murder
convictions and sentences in cases of maternal infant-murder. 63 The infanticide
statute was enacted to formalize the ad hoc lenient response.64 Strictly
speaking, the infanticide reform wasn't needed in order to provide for
compassionate treatment of women who killed their babies, since, for years,
legal practice had ensured a lenient outcome. 6 5 However, the infanticide law,
by creating a specific rationalized mechanism for mercy that differentiated this
killer from others on the grounds that she had a mental disturbance linked to
birth or breastfeeding, sought to make legal practice more efficient (by
avoiding unnecessary murder charges/trials/convictions) and more humane (by
sparing this offender the threat of a capital trial/conviction).66 Allowing for,
and formalizing, flexible sentencing was a key motive for this reform, and the
"mad" construct was employed to facilitate this.6 7
The infanticide law provided for lenient punishment of women who
murdered their babies by permitting conviction for a less serious form of
homicide that carried a flexible sentence. The law might thus be construed as a
compassionate concession to unmarried women who murdered their babies at
birth, and, as such, something that may appear to be at odds with prevailing
patriarchal attitudes towards unmarried mothers. However, this Article will
demonstrate how the infanticide law and sentencing practice under it were also
patriarchal in nature. Before exploring these issues, I will discuss sentencing
practice in cases where women were convicted of infanticide. As I will show in
the following section, the courts treated women convicted of infanticide very
leniently, something that seems anomalous with wider patriarchal structures
61. Capital punishment was abolished for "ordinary" murders in 1964 when the death penalty was
limited to murders involving politically motivated killings, and murders of on-duty Garda (police)
and prison officers. Criminal Justice Act 1964 § 1 (Act No. 5/1964) (Ir.). Non-capital murder was
punished by penal servitude for life. Criminal Justice Act 1964 §2 (Act No. 5/1964) (Ir.). Capital
punishment was completely abolished in 1990. Criminal Justice Act 1990 §1 (Act No. 16/1990)
(Ir.). For further detail on the death penalty in Ireland following independence from Britain, see
David M. Doyle & Ian O'Donnell, The Death Penalty in Post-Independence Ireland, 33 J. LEG.
HIST. 65 (2012).
62. See generally Brennan, 'A Fine Mixture ofPity and Justice', supra note 7.
63. Id. at 811-18.
64. Id. at 832-33.
65. Id. at 811-18, 827-33.
66. See id. at 827-33.
67. Discussed further infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
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that were particularly harsh in their treatment of women in general, and of
unmarried mothers in particular.
III. IRISH INFANTICIDE SENTENCING
With the enactment of the 1949 Infanticide Act, the new offense of
"infanticide" effectively supplanted murder, manslaughter, and concealment of
birth, as a conviction option in cases in which women killed their babies.6' As
outlined in section II, according to information in the records consulted for this
research, thirty-one women have been convicted of infanticide since the
enactment of the 1949 statute. Most of these convictions occurred during the
1950s and 1960s, and there are no recorded convictions for infanticide after
1973, though gaps in the records mean that it is not possible to state
definitively that no woman has been convicted of or sentenced for this offense
since the early 1970s.69 Therefore, the analysis of infanticide sentencing in this
study is largely historical. However, as I will show, the issues raised relating to
how these women were sentenced continue to resonate, highlighting the
importance of understanding the structural causes of offending, the limits of the
criminal law in this regard, and the patriarchal interests served by the lenient
treatment of women offenders, particularly, as in the case of infanticide, where
gender inequality played a significant role in the commission of the crime.
Sentencing information is available for twenty-nine cases in the sample,
summarized in Table A:
Table A: Summary of Sentences Imposed




68. See generally Brennan, Social Norms and the Law in Responding to Infanticide, supra note 8
(analyzing how the new law was applied in the courts).
69. Id.
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Probation/recognizance 670
Other 5
Specific requirements attached to above:
To keep the peace and be of good behavior 17
Reside at convent 3
Medical treatment 3 (2 inpatient)
Reside with parents 2
Return to husband 1
Despite that infanticide is a mitigated form of murder carrying a maximum
penalty of life imprisonment, as shown by the above table, punishment was
overwhelmingly lenient. While custodial sentences were imposed in most cases
(62.1 percent), the vast majority of these (88.9 percent) were suspended.
Indeed, only two women in the sample spent any time in prison, in one case for
thirteen weeks and in the other for three years. Six women were given a
probation order or a recognizance. In the "other" category one woman was
fined; one woman was discharged without conditions; one woman was ordered
to reside at a convent for a period of between six to twelve months; one woman
was given inpatient hospital treatment (between six to twelve months); and,
finally, one was ordered to surrender herself for sentence when called. Overall,
the approach taken reflects the trend elsewhere in relation to infanticide
sentencing, whereby women are rarely imprisoned for this offense.7 ' However,
70. In one case where the offender was disposed of in the District Court, the Probation of Offenders
Act 1907 7 Edw. 7 c. 17 (Eng.) was applied "without conviction." RCGSC, Unknown Name (Co.
Cavan, 1964) at app. D, https://www.garda/ie/en/About-Us/Publications/Annual%20Reports/An-
Garda-Siochana-Annual-Reports/1964-Commissioner-s-Reports.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW95-
83WT] (last visited May 15, 2018).
71. See, e.g., NIGEL WALKER, 1 CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND: THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
133-34 (1968) (discussing sentencing for infanticide in England and Wales following the
enactment of the Infanticide Act 1922, demonstrating a continuous decline in the use of
imprisonment and its replacement with non-custodial sentences such as probation); Robyn
Lansdowne, Infanticide: Psychiatrists in the Plea Bargaining Process, 16 MONASH U. L. REV. 41,
59-60 (1990) (discussing infanticide sentencing in New South Wales, Australia, between 1976 and
1980, which, though the numbers were small, indicated a tendency to impose non-custodial
sentences on women convicted of that crime, while women convicted of manslaughter by
diminished responsibility did not consistently receive similarly lenient treatment); Daniel Maier-
Katkin & Robbin S. Ogle, Policy and Disparity: The Punishment of Infanticide in Britain and
America, 21 INT'L. J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 305, 310 (1997) (discussing sentencing data
for infanticide in England and Wales between 1982 and 1988, which showed that almost eighty
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in this regard it is important to note that while the infanticide law recognized
that a more lenient criminal justice response was necessary, it neither generated
nor mandated lenient inclinations. Even prior to the infanticide reform in
Ireland, women who killed their babies at birth were generally not
imprisoned.72
A woman given a suspended sentence or a probation order after being
convicted of infanticide was required to abide by particular conditions. The
most common of these was a requirement to keep the peace and/or be on good
behavior for a specified period (normally no more than two years). However,
other, more onerous conditions were sometimes demanded, including
requirements that had a carceral element, such as to reside at a religious
institution for a specified period. Based on the evidence available for the cases
in this sample of infanticide convictions, from 1950 onward, three women were
given a period of institutional residence.
One offender, Nellie 0, was to enter a Good Shepard Convent for not less
than six months but not more than twelve months, "as the nuns decide,"
following a plea of guilty to infanticide at the Central Criminal Court. Nellie,
a 29-year-old domestic servant, lived with her parents. According to her
statement, three months prior to the birth, she had visited the doctor "as I did
not get unwell" (presumably meaning had not been menstruating), and had
been told she was pregnant. She concealed her pregnancy from her mother,
Margaret, telling her that there was something wrong with her kidneys. On the
night that she gave birth, she went to bed around 11 p.m., having had a pain in
her back from the previous day. She had told Margaret about this but refused to
allow for a doctor to be called. Nellie and her mother shared a bed, a sleeping
an arrangement that was not uncommon in families living in cramped living
conditions at that time. Nellie said she was "in and out of bed during the night
trying to get ease," but got up at around 4 a.m. and told her mother there was
something wrong with her.
Here Nellie and Margaret's stories diverge. Margaret (who was also
charged with murder, though that charge was later dropped) claimed that at this
point she discovered the baby in the bed, and had put Nellie back into bed with
the baby. She said the baby was warm, but she didn't know whether it was
alive; that it hadn't moved or cried; and that, although the only light in the
percent of those convicted were given an order for probation and treatment, and comparing
sentencing rates to the U.S., where there is no specific infanticide statute, and where approaches to
sentencing of women convicted of offenses related to killing their babies are inconsistent, with
some women experiencing harsh responses while others were given more lenient disposals).
72. See generally Brennan, Punishing Infanticide in the Irish Free State, supra note 9.
73. Nellie 0. (1953): NAI, SBCCC, V14/8/19 (Jan. 1953-Dec. 1956); RCGSC, Nellie 0. (1953) at
app. J, https://www.garda.ie/en/About-Us/Publications/Annual%20Reports/An-Garda-Siochana-
Annual-Reports/1953-Commissioner-s-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T94R-MMXJ] (last visited
May 15, 2018). For details of the case see SFCCC, ID/51/2 (Co. Limerick, Oct. 26, 1953).
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room was from a small "Sacred Heart" lamp on the table, she had sufficient
light to see the child. She said she left the room, called her husband to summon
a nurse, and sat in the backyard for an hour in a state of shock, before returning
to the bedroom to discover that the baby was dead.
Nellie said in her statement to the Gardai that after she had gotten out of
the bed at 4 a.m., Margaret went to fetch a lamp from the kitchen. Nellie was
sitting on a chamber pot by the side of the bed, and when her mother returned
with the lamp, she told her mother there was "something wrong" with her, and
her mother responded, "Oh that's a baby." She claimed that she gave birth to
the baby into the pot, and that her mother then lifted it out and put it in the bed.
She "heard the baby give a wee cry" and got back into bed. She recalled, "I
never touched the baby." When the district nurse arrived, she found Nellie in
bed with the baby lying between her legs, and the cord wrapped loosely around
its neck. The pathologist discovered injuries to the baby's face and neck that
could not have been caused in an effort at self-delivery, and determined that the
cause of death was asphyxia caused by pressure over the mouth and that shock
resulting from the injuries sustained had probably also contributed to death.74
Another woman who pleaded guilty to infanticide on a charge of
murdering her unnamed infant, was to reside at a convent for twelve months as
part of a recognizance/probation order.7 5 Finally, one woman, who killed her
newborn infant by sticking toilet paper into its mouth, was given a suspended
sentence at the Central Criminal Court after pleading guilty to infanticide; she
agreed to a period of residence at a convent of less than four months. 76 Mary R.
was a 25-year-old chemist's assistant who concealed her pregnancy and gave
birth alone in the bathroom of her lodgings in Dublin. According to her
statement to the Gardai, she gave birth on the toilet and, after being interrupted
by her landlady knocking on the bathroom door, panicked and killed the infant.
She said in her statement: "I don't know whether I got frightened-my mind
went blank and I thought it would cry and I just got toilet paper and put it in its
mouth." She then cleaned the toilet and went to her bedroom where she blessed
the child with holy water and put it under her bed. Two days later, on her way
to work, she left the body of the infant, wrapped in newspaper, brown paper
and twine, at a church.
Between 1924 and 1949 (that is, prior to the enactment of the 1949
infanticide law), almost 60 percent of women convicted of an infanticide-
related offense (mainly manslaughter or concealment of birth) were sent to a
74. SFCCC, ID/51/2 (Co. Limerick, 26 Oct. 1953).
75. NAI, SBCCC, Margaret R. (Wexford, 1950), V15-4-15 (Feb. 1946-Dec. 1952).
76. NAI, SFCCC, Mary R (1964), ID/2/162, (Dublin, May 27, 1964); SBCCC, ID/2/146A (1962-
Julyl964); RCGSC, Mary R. (1964) at app. D, http://www.garda.ie/en/About-Us/Publications
/Annual%20Reports/An-Garda-Siochana-Annual-Reports/1964-Commissioner-s-Reports.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JQJ7-WPLH] (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
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convent or similar institution. This stands in notable contrast to what is
suggested by the records consulted in this study, which shows that convents
were used in only 10 percent of cases after 1949. Possibly, sentences were
inaccurately recorded in the sources consulted and convents were used more
frequently than the evidence in this study suggests.7 8 However, if it is the case
that judges no longer sent women who killed their babies to convents as part of
their sentence after the enactment of the infanticide law, this would be a
striking change in practice.
Three women in the sample were given a disposition that included a
requirement for inpatient/outpatient medical treatment. 7 9 These offenders were
all married women who had killed older babies. For example, one offender, a
thirty-five-year-old married woman who had strangled her four-month-old
infant, the youngest of twelve children, was discharged on agreeing to enter a
mental hospital and stay there for six to twelve months following a plea of
guilty to infanticide at the Central Criminal Court. The accused's husband had
emigrated two days prior to the killing and it was stated that upon his departure
"she . . . went into a kind of religious state, praying all day before pictures and
shouting and swearing." On the night of the killing, the accused's sister-in-law
had come to visit, and "she and another woman were so disturbed that they
went for the police, leaving the eldest son, aged 17 and the eldest daughter with
their mother." The accused placed her eldest son and daughter "in front of
religious pictures, and while they were there, choked the baby." When the
police arrived, the baby was dead. The accused said, "she had been told by the
Almighty to kill the child to get her husband back." The state prosecutor had
said at the time of arraignment that the state was satisfied that the accused
should not be tried for murder because it was clear that she was "not sane" at
the time of the killing. 80
77. See generally Brennan, Punishing Infanticide in the Irish Free State, supra note 9, at 12-15.
78. As noted above, it was not possible to verify the sentence in 11 cases in this sample. Supra Section
I.
79. For the case of Christina M., see NAI, SBCCC, Christina M. (1955), V14/8/19 (Jan. 1953-Dec.
1956); RCGSC, Christina M. (1955) at 6, https://www.garda.ie/en/About-Us/Publications/Annual
%20Reports/An-Garda-Siochana-Annual-Reports/1955-Commissioner-s-Report.pdf [http://perma
.cc/E3WN-EN5B] (last visited Apr. 11, 2018). For the case of Bernadette J., see NAI, SFCCC,
Bernadette J (1966), IC/17/58 (Co. Donegal, 25 Jan. 1966); Sentence on Mother Is Suspended,
IRISH INDEP., (Mar. 4, 1966); RCGSC, Bernadette J (1966), at app. D, https://www.garda.ie/en
/About-Us/Publications/Annual%20Reports/An-Garda-Siochana-Annual-Reports/1966-
Commissioner-s-Reports.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK4P-PY3J]. For the case of Eileen C. (1971), see
State Accepts Guilty Plea to Infanticide, IRISH EXAMINER (July 17, 1971); Sentencing on Mother,
IRISH INDEP., (July 17, 1971); RCGSC, Eileen C. (1971), 26, https://garda.ie/en/About-Us
/Publications/Annual%20Reports/An-Garda-Siochana-Annual-Reports/1971-Commissioner-s-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR5J-ZGJA].
80. Christina M., supra note 79; Mother Pleads Guilty to Killing Baby, IRISH TIMES (Mar. 1, 1955).
The facts reported in the newspaper account indicate that the infanticide law was not applied
strictly in this case. There was nothing to indicate a mental disturbance caused by childbirth.
Rather, it seems the offender had a serious diagnosable mental disorder that was unconnected with
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The limited use of medical dispositions may appear surprising, particularly
given that the partially excusing rationale of the infanticide offense is that the
woman had, at the time of the killing, a disturbance in the balance of the mind
caused by the effects of childbirth or lactation. However, as I have previously
argued, the medical mitigation framework contained in the infanticide law was
based on a lay, not a medical, understanding of mental disturbance, and was not
supposed to require a diagnosed mental illness.8 1 The way the rationale was
interpreted by the courts further demonstrates that a specific mental illness was
not required, particularly in cases involving killings that took place at an
unassisted birth where a mental disturbance was often presumed due to the
circumstances in which birth took place.82 Sentencing practice, which reveals
limited use of medical disposals, and only in cases involving older (legitimate)
infants, further reinforces this point.
Very short terms of imprisonment were imposed, with 66.7 percent of the
sample being given a term of twelve months or less. Three women were given
three years' custody; two women were given two years; and one woman was
given eighteen months. However, as already noted, most of these sentences
were suspended. Sentencing remarks from judges are not available in the
records consulted8 3 and it is difficult to determine why some women were
given longer custodial terms of over twelve months. One possible aggravating
factor may have been the age of the victim, and, tied in with this, the fact that
the killing was less typical of the classic infanticide case because it had not
taken place in the context of childbirth. One woman, who had been given a
three-year suspended sentence, had killed her eleven-month-old child; another
woman, who had also killed an infant near the maximum age limit to which the
infanticide legislation applied, was given a two-year suspended sentence; in
another case, where the offender was given an eighteen-month suspended term,
the victim was twelve days old.84 Notably, the offenders in each of these cases
were married and had other children, though in the latter case she was
separated from her husband. In that case the accused, Annie M., had been
separated from her husband for over a year at the time of the killing. She was
living with her mother and other children. She had said that she found her son
childbirth and could have relied on the insanity defense. However, given that insanity required a
mandatory sentence of indefinite detention, the infanticide law offered a preferable outcome.
81. See generally Brennan, 'Traditions of English Liberal Thought:' A History of the Enactment of an
Infanticide Law in Ireland, supra note 39 at 122-33.
82. Brennan, Social Norms and the Law in Responding to Infanticide, supra note 8.
83. Some newspaper reports on some cases did make reference to the judge's comments at sentencing,
but there were very few cases where this is available.
84. NAI, SFCCC, Annie M (1953), V15/14/45 (Co. Carlow, Jan. 26, 1953); SBCCC V14/8/19 (Jan.
1953-Dec. 1956); RCGSC 1952 at 6-7, http://www.garda.ie/en/About-Us/Publications/Annual
%20Reports/An-Garda-Siochana-Annual-Reports/1952-Commissioner-s-Report.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5U2R-3883); Bernadette J., supra note 79; Eileen C., supra note 79.
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dead in bed one afternoon, but then confessed in her third statement to the
Gardai, admitting that she had killed the infant by "put[ting] the [bed] clothes
up on his little face." As an explanation for her actions she said: "I was
tormented. I did not know what I was doing because my husband denied he
was the father of my child."85
Another woman, given a suspended term of over one year, was a thirty-
one-year-old widow who killed her child at birth;86 and another woman, given
six concurrent terms of three years of penal servitude, was a married woman
who had killed six newborn infants to conceal an extramarital affair. Overall,
of the six women given custody of over one year, only one appears to fit the
stereotypical profile of the infanticide offender, namely the (young) unmarried
woman who concealed her pregnancy and killed the infant at birth. In that case,
the Attorney General had consented to a summary trial of the accused, who had
indicated a guilty plea at the district court. The accused, a twenty-one-year-old
shop assistant, had given birth at home; the body of the infant was found "with
certain injuries" in her room.88 Given the circumstances, the three-year
suspended term imposed by the district justice in this case was somewhat
unusual.
Overall, the evidence shows that women convicted of infanticide in Ireland
between 1950 and 1975 were given exceptionally lenient sentences. There was,
however, some difference in approach depending on the age of the victim and
marital status of the offender. Those who benefited most from lenient sentences
were unmarried women who killed their babies at a concealed birth. Women
who killed older babies tended not only to receive longer suspended prison
terms, but also to be given medical requirements, including in-patient
treatment. However, on the whole, but especially in cases involving newborn
victims, it is evident that infanticide offenders were not viewed as serious or
dangerous criminals, and, contrary to what the language of the 1949 Act may
suggest, were generally not considered to suffer from a mental illness that
required medical intervention.
In the wider social and legal context of the time, the legislative and
criminal justice response to infanticide is somewhat of a curiosity. Sexually
85. NAI, SFCCC, Annie M (1953), V15/14/45 (Co. Carlow, Jan. 26, 1953).
86. NAI, SBCCC, Lena M. (1957), IC/17/86 (1957-1961); RCGSC, Lena M. (1957) at 7, http://www
.garda.ie/en/About-Us/Publications/Annual%20Reports/An-Garda-Siochana-Annual-Reports/1957
-Commissioner-s-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/C66A-D4J7] (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
87. NAI, SFCCC, Mary S. (1954), V15/14/47 (Co. Kildare, Feb. 1, 1954); SBCCC, V14/8/19 (Jan.
1953-Dec. 1956); RCGSC, Mary S. (1954), at 7, https://www.garda.ie/en/About-Us/Publications
/Annual%20Reports/An-Garda-Siochana-Annual-Reports/1 953-Commissioner-s-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/63LR-L7Y7] (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
88. RCGSC, Unknown Name (Co. Kerry, 1966), at app. D, https://www.garda.ie/en/About-Us
/Publications/Annual%20Reports/An-Garda-Siochana-Annual-Reports/1966-Commissioner-s-
Reports.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4CQ-4CQL] (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
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active women had difficulty preventing pregnancy because contraception was
not legally available; they could not end a pregnancy because abortion was not
legally available; and if they gave birth outside of marriage they could expect
no state support to help them become mothers. Indeed, they faced widespread
cultural stigmatization and the possibility of institutionalization. Yet the
legislature and legal system proved consistently willing to effectively allow
women who willfully and with malice aforethought8 9 killed their newborn
illegitimate babies to escape with a suspended prison sentence, or, at worst, a
short term of residence at a religious or medical institution. This raises the
obvious question: why were those with political and legal power willing to
effectively let those few women who killed their newborn babies get away with
murder, while refusing to give all women any measure of autonomy over their
fertility? This question is addressed in the following sections, first with
reference to gender construction theory in the context of punishing women,
and, second, through the concept of paternalism. Both approaches serve to
explain lenient sentencing of women who killed their babies as reflecting and
reinforcing patriarchal norms, values, and structures.
IV. GENDER AND SENTENCING: GENDER CONSTRUCTIONS OF WOMEN WHO
KILL AND THE HARSH/LENIENT DEBATE
Literature on women offenders highlights the role of gender constructions
based on patriarchal norms of womanhood in sentencing practices. Within
wider social discourse, women are often viewed through the lens of a good/bad
dichotomy. 90 The "good" woman construct reflects idealized patriarchal gender
expectations that hold women to be passive, nurturing, self-sacrificing, weak,
vulnerable, irrational, and particularly susceptible to mental instability due to
their biological functions. If a women offender can be constructed within legal
discourse as meeting the feminine ideal, she may, notwithstanding the
seriousness of her crime and her apparent breach of gender norms by
committing a criminal offense in the first place, be rehabilitated back into
normative femininity. This construct supports lenient sentencing. The other
side of this construct, however, is that those women who cannot be recuperated
into the feminine ideal are treated more harshly under the law.9 1 Worrall, for
89. The infanticide statute specifically requires that the woman committed a "willful act or omission"
and that the requirements for murder, which include malice aforethought, were established. See
Infanticide Act 1949, § 1(3) (Act No. 16/1949) (Ir.).
90. See generally Ballinger, supra note 3, at 460-62. See also infra note 91.
91. For some of the literature on how women (including those who kill their children) are constructed
in the criminal justice system, reflecting wider gender stereotypes, see generally HILARY ALLEN,
JUSTICE UNBALANCED (1987) (exploring why women offenders are more likely than their male
counterparts to receive psychiatric sentencing disposals, discussing how women's crimes/behavior
are constructed in ways which undermine their agency, and, in this regard, how they are seen as
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example, has argued that women offenders are constructed as either "non-
criminal" (so essentially "good") or "non-women" ("bad"). 92 She identifies a
"gender contract" in which women criminals are given the chance to
"neutralize the effects of [their] law-breaking by implicitly entering into a
contract where [they] permit [their lives] to be represented primarily in terms of
[their] domestic, sexual and pathological dimensions." The gender contract
"minimizes punitive consequences."9 3  Similarly, Morrissey has identified
victims of circumstances rather than active agents); PAT CARLEN, WOMEN'S IMPRISONMENT: A
STUDY IN SOCIAL CONTROL 48-76 (1983) (discussing the impact on punishment of Scottish
sentencers' views of offenders as mothers; being viewed as a "good mother" led to more lenient
sentences, while women who were viewed as "bad mothers" were treated more harshly); SUSAN
S.M. EDWARDS, WOMEN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF THE FEMALE SUSPECT, DEFENDANT AND
OFFENDER IN CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 177-82, 183-86, 213 (1984)
(demonstrating, in a study of women offenders convicted of violent crimes and sentenced in
Manchester, England, how crimes were pathologized and treatment individualized; women were
sentenced, not according to the crime they committed, but according to the extent to which their
behavior deviated from appropriate femininity, resulting in double punishment for some women);
MORRISSEY, supra note 3, at 3-7, 21-29, passim (exploring, through a series of case studies, how
feminist, media, and legal discourses produce narratives of women who kill that largely separate
female offenders in "good" and "bad" categories, and how these characterizations serve to
neutralize female agency); LIZZIE SEAL, WOMEN, MURDER AND FEMININITY: GENDER
REPRESENTATIONS OF WOMEN WHO KILL 1-2 (2010) (reviewing the literature on this issue,
noting that women who kill their children and their abusive partners are not "culturally
unthinkable" because they can be viewed as mentally ill, and presenting a feminist analysis of
gender constructions of twelve women accused of "unusual" murders in twentieth-century
Britain); WORRALL, supra note 3, at 31-51 (arguing that women are given the opportunity to enter
into a gender contract and this serves to neutralize their offending and minimize punishment);
Armstrong, supra note 3 (exploring the theory that women are medicalized more than men through
a study of men and women sentenced for a homicide offense in Victoria, Australia, between 1985
and 1991, which found that sixty-two percent of women who killed spouses and children received
psychiatric or non-custodial sentences, but those who killed non-family members/committed more
male-like crimes were imprisoned; in contrast, ninety percent of the male offenders were
imprisoned); Ballinger, supra note 3, at 460-62 (summarizing feminist contributions on the issue
of gender construction and its impact on sentencing); Heather L. Stangle, Murderous Madonna:
Femininity, Violence, and the Myth of Postpartum Mental Disorder in Cases of Maternal
Infanticide and Filicide, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 699 (2008-2009) (exploring ways in which the
American legal system, despite not having a specific infanticide law, also adopts mythical
constructions of women who kill their children which allows for lenient treatment, and arguing
against the adoption of infanticide legislation in the USA because it would provide for "dangerous
leniency" and embrace and perpetuate false ideas about women who kill); Siobhan Weare, Bad
Mad, or Sad?: Legal Language, Narratives, and Identity Constructions of Women who Kill their
Children in England and Wales, 30 INT'L. J. SEMIOTICS L. 22 (2016) (examining specific
examples in England and Wales, demonstrating that judges construct macro-narratives that
produce gender identities for women offenders, and arguing that this negates the challenge such
women pose to ideal femininity and the motherhood mandate); Siobhan Weare, "The Mad, " "The
Bad," "The Victim:" Gendered Constructions of Women Who Kill Within the Criminal Justice
System, 2 LAWS 337 (2013) (arguing that women are constructed as victims/bad/mad, which
denies their agency and affects their treatment in the criminal justice system, and serves to
reinforce and perpetuate gender norms in social discourse); Ania Wilczynski, Mad or Bad? Child
Killers, Gender and the Courts, 37 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 419, 425-26 (1997) (arguing, through a
study of men and women who killed their children in England in the 1980s, that the criminal
justice system responds very differently to women and men at each stage of the process, from the
decision to prosecute through to sentencing).
92. Worrall, supra note 3, at 31-51.
93. Id.
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strategies that serve to either cast the offender as a victim, reflecting patriarchal
norms about the "good" woman, or that demonize her, rendering her non-
human/non-woman.9 4 Other constructions identified by writers which reflect
idealized (and non-idealized) norms of womanhood, are the "mad," "sad," and
"bad" classifications.9 5
In cases involving homicidal women, such constructions play a particularly
important role. Because women rarely commit violent offenses, the female
killer is unusual. This, in conjunction with widely held gender norms that view
violence as inimical to femininity, means that the murderess must be explained
to alleviate the angst caused by her conduct and the threat her violence poses to
the patriarchal social order.96 Constructions of women who kill are therefore
said to both explain and neutralize her violence. This is achieved by either
recuperating her back into the feminine ideal, for example by casting her as a
victim of circumstance or as mentally unstable, or, alternatively, by
demonizing her and thus rendering her as "non-woman." Both strategies serve
to deny her agency and, in so doing, neutralize the threat posed by her violent
act.97
At first glance the infanticide offender had not only committed a serious
criminal offense, but had also grossly offended the patriarchal version of
idealized femininity. By becoming pregnant outside of marriage, she breached
the mandate of feminine virtue; by killing the baby, she breached norms of
motherhood (although, arguably, being an unmarried woman, she may not have
been viewed as a "mother" anyway). However, infanticide as a crime is
constructed in such a way that it falls on the good side of the dichotomized
view of femininity. The infanticide law itself explains the crime on the basis of
a mental disturbance caused by the effects of childbirth or lactation.99 Scholars
frequently point to infanticide statutes as a prime example of the medicalization
of female violence, and, in particular, as requiring diagnosis of a postnatal
mental illness such as post-partum depression or psychosis. 100 However, while
the language of the statute suggests a requirement for diagnosis of a mental
disorder linked to childbirth or lactation, both the history of infanticide laws
94. Morrissey, supra note 3, at 24-25, passim.
95. Weare, Bad, Mad, or Sad?, supra note 91; Weare, "The Mad," "The Bad," "The Victim," supra
note 91. For more on how women filicide offenders are medicalized, see Wilczynski, supra note
91, at 425.
96. Morrissey, supra note 3, at 2, 166, 170; Seal, supra note 91, at 1-2; Weare, "The Mad," "The
Bad," "The Victim," supra note 91, 337-38.
97. Morrissey, supra note 3, at 28, 165, passim; Weare, Bad, Mad, or Sad?, supra note 91; Weare,
"The Mad," "The Bad," "The Victim," supra note 91.
98. See supra text at notes 41-42.
99. See supra note 59.
100. For examples of such critiques, see Edwards, supra note 91, at 79-100; Weare, "The Mad, " "The
Bad," "The Victim," supra note 91, at 343-45.
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and the manner in which they have been applied by the courts demonstrate that
the mental disturbance requirement encapsulates a lay, not a medical,
understanding of this crime. 101 Although this embodied lay patriarchal norms, it
did not require diagnosis of a specific mental illness (such as post-partum
depression), and it did take account of the circumstances of the crime.1 0 2 In
other words, while the law represented infanticide as an irrational act, linking it
to the idea of biologically produced mental disturbance, it was not meant to
embody a true pathologization of the offender. Rather, it was intended to, and
did, operate in such a way as to tacitly recognize the mitigating social
circumstances involved.103 Nonetheless, on the face of it at least, the infanticide
law constructs the offender as "mad," thus allowing her to be rehabilitated back
into normative femininity.
Moreover, there are other reasons why women who committed infanticide
in this study could be recuperated back into the feminine ideal, and this links
with the interpretation of female killers as being "sad" victims of circumstance.
Indeed, it is more accurate to say that how women who killed their babies,
particularly their newborn babies, were understood involved a blend of the
mad/sad constructions of female criminality. Most of the women in the sample
101. For the history behind these laws, see Brennan, 'Traditions ofEnglish Liberal Thought:' A History
of the Enactment of an Infanticide Law in Ireland, supra note 39, at 123-33 (discussing how the
medical rationale was understood by Irish reformers, and demonstrating that they. too, adopted a
lay understanding of mental disturbance, one which did not require medical diagnoses and which
was not linked to the biological consequences of childbirth, but the circumstances in which birth
took place, particularly when the woman gave birth alone following a concealed pregnancy);
Kirsten J. Kramar & W.D. Watson, The Insanities ofReproduction: Medico-Legal Knowledge and
the Development of an Infanticide Law, 15 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 237, 240-50 (2006) (exploring
the contemporary medical and ethnographic literature on the subject of infanticide and
demonstrating that medical scientists and ethnographers largely explained infanticide on socio-
economic, not biological, grounds); Tony Ward, The Sad Subject of Infanticide: Law, Medicine
and Child Murder 1860-1938, 8 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 163, 166-70, 174-75 (1999) (discussing the
question of medicalization in the background to the English and Welsh Infanticide Act 1922, and
arguing that the disturbance in the balance of the mind requirement was a lay, not a medical,
concept-there is no evidence that medical theory was considered by those who drafted or enacted
the law). For how infanticide laws have been liberally applied in the courts, see Brennan, Social
Norms and the Law in Responding to Infanticide, supra note 8 (demonstrating through analysis of
archival court records that the medical rationale of the Irish infanticide law operated as intended on
the basis of lay understanding of the mental state of the woman at the time of birth/the killing, and
how in practice there appears to have been a presumption of mental disturbance which tacitly took
account of the social circumstances involved); Ronald D. Mackay, The Consequences of Killing
Very Young Children, CRIM. L. REv. 21, 29 (1993) (concluding, from an examination of
psychiatric reports in a sample of infanticide cases in England and Wales in the 1980s, that the
mental disturbance requirement was "primarily ... a legal device for avoiding the mandatory
penalty and thus ensure that leniency could be shown in appropriate cases"); Allison Morris &
Ania Wilczynski, Rocking the Cradle: Mothers Who Kill Their Children, in MOVING TARGETS:
WOMEN, MURDER AND REPRESENTATION 198, 207-10 (1993) (arguing that infanticide legislation
has been interpreted "liberally" in a number of jurisdictions including England, Hong Kong, and
Australia, and has been used to allow for "covert" consideration of the socio-economic factors that
lead to the killing).
102. Brennan, Social Norms and the Law in Responding to Infanticide, supra note 8.
103. Id.
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in this study had killed an illegitimate baby at or soon after a secret birth. If her
concealment and the killing could be construed as being motivated, in the
wider social context of the time, by a desire to conceal her shame and preserve
her respectability, then, according to prevailing norms, she behaved as a
"good" woman would in her situation. Indeed, the act of infanticide was, from
that perspective, arguably a manifestation of appropriate femininity.104 This
interpretation could be bolstered if she could be considered faultless in her fall
from grace, particularly if she could be viewed as the victim of callous male
sexuality. This is evident in the way Irish infanticide offenders were
understood. For example, one document relating to the 1949 infanticide reform,
in which a number of mitigating factors in these cases were outlined, notes that
the circumstance that most affected the ordinary person in their judgment of
these cases was that the father of the child, who was "so often more guilty than
the woman herself . .. got away scot free," while the woman had to bear "all
the trouble and all the shame." 05
The characterization of the Irish infanticide offender as embodying a mix
of the mad/sad construction of female offenders, particularly her victimhood
vis-A-vis the man who impregnated her, is best encapsulated in a 1941
memorandum written by a female probation officer on the treatment of
infanticide offenders by the courts. The memorandum paints a profile of those
appearing at the Central Criminal Court on charges relating to the death of their
infants. 10 6 In relation to the cause of the "downfall" of these offenders, the
author noted that in the case of "young girls," it was due to "ignorance which
left them an easy prey to the snares of the first unscrupulous man who cared to
take advantage of them;" with older women, they had "very often [been] led
astray by the promise of marriage."10 7 It was noted that in many of these cases
the offender might not realize that she was pregnant for some time and then,
upon discovering her situation, "becomes bewildered, even desperate." This is
particularly true in the case of domestic servants, where, being afraid to risk
"instant dismissal" from her post should her pregnancy become known, the
woman keeps silent and continues as normal until the time of birth, and "[t]hen
104. See KIRSTEN J. KRAMAR, UNWILLING MOTHERS, UNWANTED BABIES: INFANTICIDE IN CANADA 7
(2005).
105. Monsignor Dargan, Proposed Infanticide Legislation 4 (Feb. 24, 1949) (on file in
AB8/B/XVIII/10, The McQuaid Papers, Archives of Archbishop of Dublin).
106. E.M. Carroll, Memorandum re: Women and Girls Who Come Before the Central Criminal Court
on Serious Criminal Charges and Other Matters 1 (July 7, 1941), in DEP'T OF JUSTICE (IR.),
REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE TO ESTABLISH THE FACTS OF STATE
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in the frenzy of a moment and still trying to cover her shame, she kills her
child."
108
The perception of the role of men in the above is particularly interesting in
that there was a willingness to acknowledge that men had played a part in the
crime-at least to the extent that they had contributed to the situation that led to
the woman committing it. However, it was individual men-reckless, selfish,
manipulative men who took advantage of vulnerable women and then
abandoned them to their fate-who were responsible, not the dominant gender
order that enabled this double standard of sexuality. As noted, patriarchy does
not always operate for the benefit of all men as against all women; it does not
involve total domination of women as a category by men as a category.10 9 In
this regard, Ballinger highlights the role of gender constructions of normative
masculinity as another element (in addition to that of gender constructions of
female killers) in explaining punishment of women who kill their abusive
husbands: the offender met gender norms of appropriate femininity because she
could be constructed as a "victim," while the deceased, her violent husband
who had displayed "excessive masculinity," did not conform to masculine
norms. How both offender and victim were constructed affected the outcome in
the case, leading to lenient treatment for the offender.1 10 Men who took
advantage of "innocent" women by having sex with them outside of marriage
without giving consideration to, or evading the consequences of, their sexual
licentiousness were not ideal men either. They had shirked their responsibility
to be husbands and providers within the patriarchal family."' These men could
therefore be blamed for contributing to the situation, and although they were
not held criminally responsible, their failure to fulfill their role in the
patriarchal social order did allow for a sympathetic understanding of
infanticidal women. In both cases the focus was on individual responsibility-
moral in the case of the men, and criminal in the case of the women-rather
than the role of wider patriarchal values and structures. 11 2
If the offender demonstrated remorse, this may have also facilitated her
accommodation within the "good woman" stereotype. At least 71 percent of the
infanticide convictions in this sample involved a guilty plea. 113 One of the more
108. Id. at 2.
109. See generally Ballinger, supra note 3, at 462-64; Connell, supra note 48, at 142-46; CAROL
SMART, Legal Regulation or Male Control, in LAW, CRIME AND SEXUALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINISM
128, 137-45 (1995).
110. See generally Ballinger, supra note 3.
111. Id. See also ANETTE BALLINGER, GENDER, TRUTH AND STATE POWER: CAPITALISING ON
PUNISHMENT 60-61 (2016).
112. For further discussion on the tendency to individualize criminality, see infra notes 141-49 and
accompanying text.
113. For further detail, see Brennan, Social Norms and the Law in Responding to Infanticide, supra
note 8.
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interesting cases examined in this study highlights the importance of gender
constructions, including those regarding remorse, in how women convicted of
infanticide were sentenced. The case involved a married woman, Mary S, who
killed six newborn infants conceived in the context of an extra-marital
relationship. Mary's husband had immigrated to England, and each time she
became pregnant by her lover she hid her pregnancy from the outside world
and killed the infant at birth. She confessed to her crimes while being treated
for a mental breakdown soon after the birth and death of her last-born infant.
Her mental illness appears to have been linked to her intense remorse over her
crimes. 114 She was given the most severe sentence in this sample: three years of
penal servitude on each count to run concurrent; this was not suspended. 15 The
comparative severity of the sentence imposed is most likely a consequence of
the repeated nature of her offending, but possibly it also indicates disapproval
of the wider circumstances involved, namely the on-going extra-marital
affair-in other words, that she was doubly punished because she broke gender
norms with regard to "wifely" behavior.
However, a newspaper report on the case indicates that she was not
perceived to have fallen so far from the feminine ideal that she was beyond
sympathy. At the Central Criminal Court, Judge Murnaghan, in his sentencing
remarks stated: "You have pleaded guilty to six terrible offenses but I am not
going to make things any more difficult for you, because I believe you now see
the awful thing you have done, and I feel you regret it." Her victimhood is also
highlighted by one of the investigating Garda officers who stated that her lover
had "gained more or less complete control over [her]." Another factor which
may have influenced the sentencing decision was that her husband, who had
been living in England for years, said he would take her back and be good to
her while he was living." 6 Scholars have noted that the courts may rely on
social control mechanisms such as the family when punishing women, which
can lead them to forego formal penal methods."'7 This is evident in some other
cases in the sample, where offenders were required to reside with their parents,
or, in one case, return to her estranged husband, as part of the sentencing
disposal.!t8 In summary, despite the apparent breach of feminine norms, Mary
S. could still be accommodated within stereotypical notions of womanhood:
she could be re-socialized into the patriarchal family unit; she was viewed as a
victim of male control; she was evidently remorseful of her crimes; and she
experienced a severe mental illness.
114. Unpublished case file, Mary S. (1954) (on file throughout NAI; SFCCC, V15/14/47 (Co. Kildare,
Feb. 1, 1954); and SBCCC, V14/8/19 (Jan. 1953-Dec. 1956)).
115. Unpublished case file, Mary S. (on file in SBCCC, V14/8/19 (Jan. 1953-Dec. 1956)).
116. Three Years for Killing Six Children, IRISH TIMES (Feb. 20, 1954).
117. See generally Mary Eaton, JUSTICE FOR WOMEN: FAMILY, COURT AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1986).
118. See supra Table A.
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Overall, rather than being viewed as a serious or violent criminal, or as
someone who had committed a rational act in response to intolerable social
circumstances, the infanticide offender was understood to be a "young girl" or
an "unfortunate woman" who deserved pity and not punishment. Her crime was
constructed as not being truly criminal.119 She was the beneficiary of being
constructed as mad/sad and, therefore, as meeting norms of appropriate
femininity. In this regard, sentencing of this offender reflected and embodied
patriarchal norms and values.
A. Gender Construction Unpicked-A Necessary Evil?
While individual offenders, such as the women in this sample, may benefit
from being constructed as meeting idealized femininity, lenient treatment based
on gender constructions has been criticized because the cost of mercy is the
denial of a woman's agency and the structural causes of her offense.120 First,
although non-agentic explanations may help individual offenders secure a more
lenient disposal, it is said that they also reinforce and perpetuate gender
stereotypes in wider society, casting all women as irrational, passive,
vulnerable, and weak. 12 1 Linked to the issue of agency denial is the second
problem with good/bad woman gender constructions, which is that they
individualize criminality, detracting from and indeed obscuring the structural
causes of offending: criminal conduct is viewed as residing in the individual, in
her weakness, irrationality, victimhood, etc., not in the wider socio-political
context which led to the offense. 1 22 As Ballinger has argued in the context of
child murder in early twentieth-century England and Wales,
"[L]eniency ... came at a price, particularly when it was the end result of
replacing agentic, rational explanations with pathological excuses for women's
actions, because such a strategy neutralized the perceived threat that these
women posed to the social order. It therefore also minimized the opportunity
for the development of an alternative truth. In particular, it undermined the
structural causes of infanticide and child murder such as gross gender
inequality and the wider social and economic circumstances which flowed from
that inequality." 12 3
119 See Worrall, supra note 3, at 31-51.
120. See generally Ballinger, supra note 3, at 475-76; Ballinger, supra note 111, at 57, 66, 74;
Morrissey, supra note 3, 1-27, passim.
121 See generally Ballinger, supra note 3, at 475; Morrissey, supra note 3, at 3-7, 36-37, passim;
Weare, supra note 91, at 345, 350-54.
122. See, e.g., Ballinger, supra note 111, at 57, 66, 74; Ballinger, supra note 3, at 475-76, 478;
Morrissey, supra note 3, at 1-27.
123. Ballinger, supra note 111, at 57.
2018] 171
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
The upshot of this, according to Ballinger, is that punishment of female
offenders helps to maintain the heteropatriarchal social order. 12 4 Indeed, she
argues that the key to understanding women's punishment is "the state's role in
the production and reproduction of the gendered social order."1 2 5 Specifically,
in this regard, gender constructions of women who kill "produce and reproduce
the gendered subject," reinforce gender differences in society, and
individualize offending, which in combination serve to sustain
heteropatriarchy: the gendered social order is maintained and the structural
causes of offending which lie in patriarchy are unchallenged. 12 6
For example, focusing on the treatment of women who killed their abusive
husbands in England between 1900 and 1965, Ballinger argues that the female
and male gender constructions employed categorized cases of women
retaliating in the context of domestic violence as exceptional rather than a
consequence of the unequal power structure that the institution of marriage
maintains between husbands and wives.1 27 The offender was constructed in
such a way as to highlight her "helplessness and victimhood."128 Such
constructions reinforced the inferior status of all women, presented the case as
"extraordinary," and stymied "long term structural changes for women as a
category."' 29 Relatedly, male victims were viewed as "'bad apples' within a
barrel of otherwise unproblematic masculinity."1 30 Thus, the problematic
patriarchal structures involved, namely the institution of marriage, which
traditionally enshrined male domination of women, remained unchallenged.131
Mercy stemming from such constructions was a "conservative strategy which
sought to preserve the institution of marriage . . . and the existing gender
order."1 32
Similarly, Ballinger argues that the legal response to women who killed
their babies and young children in the early twentieth century 33 was closely
connected to maintaining the gendered social order.1 34 Lenient treatment of
these offenders, while well-intentioned, came at the expense of rational agentic
explanations and so relied upon and supported gender stereotypes and
124. Ballinger, supra note 3.
125. Id. at 476.
126. Id. at 464, 475-76, 478; Ballinger, supra note 111, at 74.
127. Ballinger, supra note 3, at 475-76.
128. Id. at 475.
129. Id. at 475-76.
130. Id. at 476.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 476.
133. Ballinger, supra note 111. The cases in her sample pre-dated the Infanticide Act of 1922 or fell
outside its scope because the victim was over one year of age.
134. Id.at74.
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undermined structural causes, such as gender inequality. Again, this served the
interests of heteropatriarchy, because gender inequality, poverty, and the
limited alternatives available to these women remained hidden and therefore
unchallenged. 35
These analyses of punishment based on gender construction theories make
an important contribution to understanding and critiquing sentencing of women
offenders. They show how gender constructions, which may or may not result
in lenient sentencing, deny the woman's agency and the structural causes of her
crime in the courtroom, and can reinforce gender stereotypes in wider society
and serve patriarchy by disguising structural inequality, thus allowing the status
quo to remain unchallenged. I would like, however, to suggest two limitations
to these arguments.
First, while theoretically it can be said that the denial of women's agency
in the courtroom may sustain and perpetuate wider gender norms by casting all
women as irrational victims of circumstance or pathology,1 3 6 it is difficult to
assess the significance of denying agency in more practical terms. In other
words, whether and to what extent legal constructions of women who kill make
an appreciable contribution to the perpetuation of wider gender norms is
questionable. Can we evidence the impact on society in general, and on non-
criminal women and their lived experiences in particular? For example, the
infanticide law, on the face of it at least, constructs women who kill their
babies as being mentally disturbed as a consequence of childbirth, and,
therefore, according to feminist thinking, constructs all women, but especially
new mothers, as being vulnerable to biologically produced mental disturbance.
But does this legal construct augment or consolidate existing social
constructions of all women? Are all women, but particularly those who give
birth, viewed as (potentially) irrational non-agents who may pose a risk to their
children? If this is the case, does infanticide law and practice add to this? And,
if so, what impact does this have on women, particularly those who are
pregnant, parturient, or nursing, in terms of how they are understood, and, more
importantly, then treated as citizens?
Ultimately, the question is: if women are already viewed according to
social gender norms as potentially irrational beings due to their biology, then
what tangible impact does the law or courtroom practice have in helping to
sustain such ideologies, and what are the concrete implications of this for other
women? It is unclear in these feminist gender-construction critiques, for
example, how the use of stereotypical gender constructs in the courtroom in
relation to criminal women make their way into wider societal discourse, and,
if they do, what impact this has on how non-criminal women are viewed. For
135. Id. at 57, 66, 74.
136. See supra note 91.
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instance, even if the wider public were aware of how the law or the courts
constructed women-through, for example, extensive media reporting-it is
questionable whether this would have a noticeable impact on reinforcing
stereotypes, particularly in light of women's limited contribution to criminality
as a whole and the fact that criminal women might well be viewed as being
"different" from the rest of the population. In other words, while the way
women in general are understood according to patriarchal norms may affect the
way women offenders are perceived and treated, the way criminal women are
understood may have little bearing on how the rest of the female population is
viewed.
In short, the criminal justice system may, by employing stereotypical
gender constructions, "reproduce[e] . . . the gendered subject," 13 7 help validate
gender norms, but it is questionable whether this makes an appreciable
contribution to the perpetuation of such norms in wider society overall. Indeed,
there are other institutions which undoubtedly play a more important role in
reinforcing and perpetuating gender stereotypes, such as schools, churches, the
family, and other parts of the law which have a greater impact on women's
daily lived experiences (such as, for example, family law, health care law, and
employment law). In the broader context, the criminal law may have a limited
impact. In this light, if the criminal courts did not employ gender constructions
it seems unlikely that the gender ideologies from which they are drawn would
inevitably collapse or appreciably diminish in wider societal discourse.
Further, it may be important to draw a distinction between legal practice
and the law as enshrined in legislation. In this regard, a question is raised about
what role the criminal courts can be expected to play in challenging societal
stereotypes. Arguably the courts should avoid stereotyping in the way the law
is applied and sentences are determined, and certainly there are some areas
where it would be crucial, for the purpose of reaching the correct decision and
vindicating victims' rights, that concerted efforts be made in this regard. One
example that springs to mind is in the adjudication of rape cases where sexist
and damaging "rape myths" result in misunderstandings of what constitutes
rape. under the law, contributing to low conviction rates for this offense., 38
Further, as I argue later in the section and in the conclusion, the criminal law,
particularly at sentencing should be more open to taking account of the
structural causes of crime, something which would by implication require
judges to avoid stereotyping offenders.
However, it is questionable whether the courts should refute gender
stereotypes simply to challenge, or to avoid contributing to the preservation of,
137. Ballinger, supra note 3, at 476.
138. Jacqueline M. Gray & Miranda A.H. Horvath, Rape Myths in the Criminal Justice System, in
WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FAILING VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS? 15-42 (E.
Milne et al. eds., 2018).
[Vol. 30:139174
Murderous Mothers & Gentle Judges
these norms in wider society, particularly if doing so might risk more
punishment for the offender in circumstances where lenient treatment is
deserved. Further, when gender stereotypes are pervasive in a society, can we
expect judges and others involved in these cases to even recognize that they
themselves are succumbing to such constructs in the way they assess the cases
they encounter in the courtroom, particularly if this issue has not attracted
attention? If they are not conscious that they are relying on gender
constructions, then how can we expect judges and other actors to challenge
them? This is even more apposite where the law itself also embodies gender
stereotypes, as is the case with the Infanticide Act, because, in so doing, the
law has arguably legitimized that construct, at least within the courtroom
context; more importantly, it has formalized it as part of legal doctrine. Are the
courts to then challenge both societal and legal norms in the way they practice
justice? In this respect, it may be worth drawing a distinction between legal
rules and criminal justice practice. The gender construction argument may have
more potency in terms of critiquing legal doctrines which embody gendered
understandings of women: first, because we might expect those who create law
to avoid sexist stereotyping and to play a part in challenging inequality,1 39 and,
second, because what "the law" as a body of rules and doctrines says may have
a greater impact than individual court decisions on wider society, and its
understanding of the world.
Finally, if gender stereotypes help to ensure lenient treatment for offenders
who do not deserve a harsh outcome because of the circumstances involved, do
we want the courts to challenge those norms when the consequence of
highlighting the offender's rational agency is likely to be harsher punishment?
If they do contest gendered understandings of criminality in this way, but also
provide for lenient outcomes, it is difficult to see how such differential
treatment could be justified. This links into my second critique of gender
construction theory, which relates to the individualization of crime in wider
criminal law theory and doctrine.
Gender construction theory also reveals how relying on stereotypes
individualizes the offender and denies the structural causes of crime, thus
helping perpetuate wider inequalities. Rather than acknowledging that gender
inequality played an important role in the crime, the legal system blames
woman's (supposedly defective) femininity. This is the more troubling
consequence of the employment of gender constructions because it reveals the
link between how crime is understood and responded to in the courtroom and
the perpetuation of socio-political inequality, notably in this instance
patriarchal structures, a point I return to in the following section, using the
139. Whether those involved in infanticide law reform in the early and mid-twentieth centuries would
have been able to challenge pervasive social stereotypes of women is, however, questionable. To
do so they would have needed to recognize that these stereotypes existed.
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concept of paternalism. As Carol Smart argues, "[t]he law can . . . be
understood as a mode of reproduction of the existing patriarchal order....
[L]egislation does not create patriarchal relations but it does in a complex and
often contradictory fashion reproduce the material and ideological conditions
under which these conditions may survive."1 40 However, understanding this
process through the lens of gender construction does have one limitation.
Analyses of women's punishment that critique the law for utilizing gender
constructions that deny the structural causes of offending overlook that the
criminal law on the whole generally excludes the role of socio-political
structural factors in criminal offending: both in how it ascribes criminal
liability and how it punishes, criminal behavior is individualized. 14 1
Norrie has demonstrated how modem criminal law doctrine and
punishment theory, informed by the Enlightenment concept of "liberal
individualism," is based on the idea of the "abstract juridical man," a free,
rational, calculating and responsible individual divorced from his social
context. 14 2 As a result, criminality is always decontextualized and the wider
social and political conflicts which affect the way a person reasons, behaves,
etc., are pushed aside. 14 3 Even where the harshness of the law is mitigated
through the use of insanity-type doctrines, such as the insanity defense,
diminished responsibility, and infanticide, psychiatric discourse itself also
"decontextualizes social agency .. . by locating the problem of insanity in the
constitution of the individual."l44 Thus, the criminal law "obscures ... social
realities" 4 5 and instead locates fault in the individual, either by blaming their
rational choice to break the law or their irrational behavior stemming from
individual pathology.
The criminal law, therefore, emphasizes rationality and agency, basing
liability and punishment on the concepts of free will and choice. What gender
construction theory highlights is that women criminals are interpreted in ways
that emphasize their irrationality and lack of agency. Although this may allow
for lenient treatment, it does so without acknowledging the role of structural
inequality in offending. However, while such discourses of female criminality
may be criticized, it is important to recognize that decontextualization of
offenders is not limited to women and is not solely a function of gender
constructions, but of the law's wider theoretical foundations. Within the
140. See SMART, supra note 109, at 144.
141. For a discussion of individualism in criminal law, see Norrie, supra note 6, at 9-29.
142. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 19-40 & 304-332; see especially id at 225 n.140 (noting how "liberal legal enterprise"
structures "the legal subject around a psychological individualism that excludes social, moral and
police conflict from legal discourse")
144. Id. at 189.
145. Id at 23.
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criminal law, all individuals, male and female, are abstract constructs who are
never understood in terms of the social and political structures, such as gender,
race and class inequality, that lead to their criminal offending. Thus, even if
women offenders were viewed in non-stereotyped terms, the law would still
refuse to take account of the socio-political causes of their crimes. Ridding
criminal adjudication of gender constructions, therefore, is only part of the
solution.
Those who use gender construction theory to critique punishment of
women offenders seek rational agentic constructions of women's criminality
that acknowledge wider structural causes, but without an increase in
punishment, although they do recognize the challenge inherent in this
ambition. 14 6 As the above demonstrates, in a context where the criminal law
generally will not recognize socio-political mitigation, it is difficult to see how
lenient treatment of someone such as the infanticide offender could result or be
justified if the courts were to challenge gender stereotypes and recognize
women's rational agency. Indeed, no or reduced agency is what is arguably
required under criminal law theory and doctrine to generate and defend lenient
treatment. With regard to specific infanticide laws, for example, the medical
rationale adopted was necessary for the purpose of legislating to allow for
special lenient treatment of this offender without infringing the law's
requirement for individual responsibility. 14 7 In other words, it would not have
been possible to allow for social mitigation; officially, at least, pathologizing
the infanticide offender was necessary to allow for lenient disposal. As Norrie
has noted, "[p]sychiatric discourse [i]s a convenient aid to rescue the law from
the embarrassing consequences of its harsh narrowness while at the same time
avoiding any focus on the social conditions that gave rise to the crimes in
question." 48
In short, in a context where criminal liability is based on the notion of the
rational, free and abstract individual who chooses to offend, and where the law
cannot or will not openly countenance the role of social mitigation in
attributing liability for and punishing any form of criminal offending,
constructions of an offender that serve to mitigate by denying agency and
rationality are arguably a necessary evil in helping foster and then justify
differential lenient treatment. As it stands, it seems it is not possible or even
realistic, in the context of wider criminal theory, to have both an
146. See, e.g., Morrissey, supra note 3, at 35.
147. KRAMAR, supra note 104, at 88, 95; Brennan, 'Traditions of English Liberal Thought:'A History
of the Enactment of an Infanticide Law in Ireland, supra note 39, at 126, 132; Ward, supra note
101, at 165.
148. Norrie, supra note 6, at 190 (referring to Smith's study of the use of the insanity defense in
nineteenth-century Britain in cases of parents who killed their babies). See also ROGER SMITH,
TRIAL BY MEDICINE: INSANITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN VICTORIAN TRIALS 143-160 (1981).
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acknowledgement of agency/rationality and mitigated punishment.1 49 In this
regard, the entire criminal law must be challenged to allow for all offenders,
not only women, to be criminalized and punished according to their
responsibility, which should be assessed in such a way as to recognize their
rationality in the context of wider socio-economic-political inequality.
Considering these issues in the context of the Irish infanticide offender,
although the Infanticide Act labeled the crime as an act of "madness," in
practice, social circumstances were taken into consideration in the way the law
was applied. 150 This held out the possibility of structural causes (such as
cultural stigmatization of unmarried mothers, sexual double standards, poverty,
lack of support, gender inequality, and access to reproductive autonomy) being
recognized. While courts may have tacitly acknowledged social mitigation,
however, they were arguably still focused on her individual circumstances
(e.g., her sense of shame about becoming pregnant outside of marriage and/or
the fact that the father had abandoned her), rather than on wider structural
factors (e.g., stigmatization and sexual double standards).15 ' Further, through
the infanticide doctrine she was officially viewed through the lens of gendered
mental disturbance, which downplayed her agency. I would argue that her
agency was not entirely eradicated, though, because the statute did require that
her conduct was "willful," and that she had killed with the mens rea for
murder.1 52 Despite this, ultimately, infanticide was not represented as a rational
response to the personal and structural circumstances involved.
However, infanticide law and practice, which takes a sympathetic response
to unmarried women who kill their babies at birth, allowed for an imperfect
contextualization of their crimes in a society where unmarried mothers were
highly stigmatized and faced many structural difficulties. It would have been
better to acknowledge more openly structural factors, but at the end of the day
the social context was not completely ignored. Given that the criminal law does
not generally take account of the wider social, economic, or political context of
an offender's crime in assessing their criminal guilt or in determining
punishment, the approach taken to infanticide was perhaps the best that could
be hoped for in terms of recognizing mitigating factors. Ultimately, what the
Infanticide Act and its sentencing practice allowed for was an imperfect
contextualization of the crime, with minimal criminalization.
In summary, gender construction theories allow us to see how sentencing
of the Irish infanticide offender reflected norms about gender: offenders were
treated leniently because they were constructed as "good" women according to
149. See Wilczynski, supra note 91, at 433.
150. See supra note 101.
151. See, e.g., supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (quoting probation officer).
152. Infanticide Act 1949 (Act No. 16/1949) (Ir.), §§ 1(2)-(3).
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patriarchal norms. Gender constructions may also help maintain patriarchal
interests by "producing and reproducing the gendered subject" (the irrational
non-agentic woman), and, consequently, denying the structural causes of
offending. Some limitations to this approach have been noted, particularly the
fact that the criminal law generally ignores the socio-political context of
offending and that, in this context, gender constructions may have been a
necessary evil to facilitate and justify lenient treatment of certain offenders.
Further, despite that the law characterized the offender as "mad," there was at
least veiled recognition of wider social factors in the law's application.
However, as I argue in the conclusion, if we want to do more to prevent the
crime of infanticide we must tackle its structural causes, including poverty,
denial of reproductive autonomy, and cultural stigmatization. In this context,
the courts bear a responsibility to draw attention to these issues.153
In the following section, the criminal justice response to infanticide is
explored further, drawing on the concept of paternalism. This also reveals how
compassionate punishment of the infanticide offender served patriarchal
interests, specifically by helping the state retain control over women's
reproductive autonomy. A paternalism analysis makes a similar contribution, in
terms of explaining and critiquing sentencing of Irish infanticide offenders, as
that made by gender construction theory, revealing the link between lenient
sentencing and the preservation of gender inequality. However, unlike gender
construction theory, which critiques the use of stereotypical constructs of
women to disguise the socio-political causes of offending, paternalism
demonstrates the link between lenient punishment and preservation of
patriarchy in a different way. By highlighting the connection between mercy
and control, paternalism demonstrates how lenient treatment of this group of
offenders functioned on a systematic level to preserve patriarchy. First, it
showed that patriarchy had a gentler side. Second, it averted the controversy
that may have arisen had women been punished more severely and the stark
impact of gender inequality, particularly with regard to reproductive choices,
had been laid bare.
153. As will be explained in the conclusion, although there have been no infanticide prosecutions or
convictions in Ireland in recent decades, the argument related to preventing infanticide nonetheless
remains relevant for a number of reasons, including its resonance outside of the Irish infanticide
context. See Brennan, Social Norms and the Law in Responding to Infanticide, supra note 8
(discussing the reasons for the decline in infanticide prosecutions in recent decades). I argue that
the impact of controversial events in the 1980s (notably the "Kerry Babies" case) and Ireland's
dramatic transition from a conservative to a liberal society played a key role in shifting attitudes to
this, now exceptionally rare, crime away from criminal prosecution.
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V. PATERNALISM, PATRIARCHY, AND INFANTICIDE
Moulds argues that legislative and judicial leniency towards women
offenders is really paternalism. 154 Paternalism (in the guise of mercy) may be
beneficial to some offenders because it can result in lenient sentencing
disposals from a desire to "protect" women from a particular evil, such as
imprisonment.155 Paternalism, however, does not involve a straightforward
exercise of compassion. Because it occurs in the context of an asymmetrical
relationship, where the recipient of mercy is inferior to the benefactor, the
apparent altruism exhibited is double-edged.1 56 For example, Moulds argues
that paternalism allows the "child" to serve the interests of the "father." 57
Paternalism, therefore, is "more complex" than chivalry and "its practice is far
more destructive in terms of psychological, social, and political
implications."' 5 8 Davis also highlights the ambiguous nature of paternalism:
while it involves elements of benevolence, it also involves the exercise of
control, and, in fact, can result in more control over the inferior party to the
relationship.159 In a sentencing context, this may mean, for example, that some
women are subject to more invasive forms of punishment than what might
otherwise be expected for the purposes of "rehabilitati[on]" or "protection."16 0
The approach to infanticide sentencing in this study demonstrates that
individual offenders did not necessarily experience the negative consequences
of paternalism. Admittedly, some women were sent to religious and medical
institutions as part of their sentence, or were required to reside with parents or
spouses. If, for example, the time spent at a "semi-penal" institution was longer
than what a prison sentence would have been, and/or if the conditions of
detainment were worse than that which pertained in prisons, particularly in
terms of the level of surveillance and control she experienced, then arguably
154. Elizabeth F. Moulds, Chivalry and Paternalism: Disparities of Treatment in the Criminal Justice
System, 31 W. POL. Q. 417 (1978).
155. Id. at 417.
156. Kathy Davis, Paternalism Under the Microscope, in GENDER AND DISCOURSE: THE POWER OF
TALK 19 (Alexandra D. Todd & Sue Fisher eds. 1988) (discussing paternalism-the aspects of
benevolence and control-in the doctor/female patient relationship).
157. Moulds, supra note 154, at 418.
158. Id. at 418.
159. Davis, supra note 156, at 23, 41-42.
160. Moulds, supra note 154, at 419-20. See Lynsey C. Black, Gendering the Condemned? Women
and Capital Punishment in Ireland Post-1922 240-274 (2016) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Trinity
College Dublin), for an example of this in Ireland where, for the purposes of protection, some
women serving a life sentence following a reprieve of the death penalty were sent to convents
rather than being released on license. Black argues that lenient treatment of these women (i.e.,
reprieving the death sentence) was grounded in patriarchy; paternalism was offered to women
because they were considered inferior but was only available to those who met gender stereotypes
(of the "good" woman), and whose agency could be denied.
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these women did experience more control as a consequence of benevolent
inclinations that kept them out of prison.' 61 However, in cases where women
were not sent to semi-penal institutions it is difficult to identify any negative
consequences of compassion for the individual offender. Instead, as I will
argue in the remainder of this section, the adverse consequences of paternalism
may have operated at a macro level, involving control over women in general
rather than simply the offender at hand.
Compassionate treatment of the infanticide offender did two things, if we
consider the issue of control. First, as Norrie and Ballinger have noted, mercy
serves to uphold the authority and legitimacy of the criminal law; 1 62 it supports
the law's validity as a mechanism of control. As explained in the previous
section, the law will not admit to or engage with the socio-political conflicts
that lead to crime, and so individualizes criminality.1 6 3 However, on occasion,
where the harsh stance the criminal law takes undermines its legitimacy, mercy
functions to preserve that legitimacy.1 6 4 Rather than have the law's authority to
penalize lawbreakers challenged on the grounds that it is unfair to
criminalize/punish severely in light of the circumstances involved, mercy will
be exercised. This is done without acknowledging the wider structural factors
involved, and for the purposes of preserving the law's authority to criminalize
and punish in that context by excluding socio-political conflicts from
consideration.1 65 Lenience, therefore, is not solely a benevolent expression
because, ultimately, it serves to maintain the authority and control of the
criminal law.
The history of infanticide provides an illustration of this. In the past, harsh
criminal law (e.g., the mandatory death penalty) conflicted with public
sentiment. As a result, the law was effectively ignored so that a compassionate
response, as desired by the public will, would be provided.1 66 Thus, although
the law and the public opinion were out of sync, criminal justice practice
extended mercy to the offender, which helped maintain the legitimacy of the
law.1 6 7 However, the law's routine subversion by such ad hoc arrangements
itself challenged its legitimacy, which eventually led to legislative reform to
161. Brennan, Punishing Infanticide in the Irish Free State, supra note 9, at 13-14, 18-21, 26.
162. Ballinger, supra note 3 at 472-73, relying on Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal
Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 17
(1977).
163. See supra text at 141-49.
164. See supra note 162.
165. Norrie, supra note 6, at 190-91, 222-25.
166. David S. Davies, Child Killing in English Law, in THE MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW
301-43, 317-18, 320-22 (Leon Radzinowicz & James W.C. Turner eds. 1945) (discussing the
background to the English and Welsh 1922 infanticide reform, beginning in the mid-eighteenth
century, and outlining problems in the law that lead to the enactment of this law).
167. See Ballinger, supra note 111, at 74.
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formalize lenience. Among the chief motivations for infanticide law reform
were avoiding the "solemn mockery" of judges pronouncing death sentences
that would never be carried out;168 the "tragic farce" of sending women for trial
for an offense they would not be convicted of;1 69 and the abuse of other
offenses used to provide for a more compassionate conviction. 1 70 Mercy,
whether informal (by, for example, commuting death sentences) or formal (as
embodied in the law), therefore operated to uphold the law's legitimacy where
it was thought to operate harshly because there was sympathy for the offender
in light of the circumstances in which her crime was committed, but where the
law could not openly take account of the role of the socio-political factors
involved.
Second, compassion not only functioned to endorse the law's legitimacy,
authority, and control, it also helped uphold the socio-political structures that
led to this crime in the first place because it showed that patriarchy had a
"gentler" side. As outlined above, the crime of infanticide in Ireland during the
middle decades of the twentieth century was deeply connected with patriarchal
cultural and legal norms, which prevented women from having control over
their reproductive lives and castigated those who breached ideals of feminine
virtue."' In other words, one of the extreme consequences of patriarchal
control of women's reproduction was infanticide. As the Irish experience of
infanticide from the 1970s onwards clearly indicates, when women are given
more reproductive choice, in terms of being able to prevent or end an unwanted
pregnancy or to be mothers to children outside of wedlock, infanticide as a
crime declines significantly.1 7 2  However, allowing women access to
contraception and abortion, or allowing them to be mothers to their illegitimate
children by offering state support or making efforts to destigmatize unmarried
motherhood, gives them control over their reproductive destinies, and
recognizes that women have a right to choose whether to be mothers and in
what circumstances. This is something that patriarchal cultures have always
struggled with, and, even with modem advancements, continue to grapple
with.1 7 3 Certainly, in the 1950s and 1960s, when most of the cases in this
168. Davies, supra note 166, at 319-20.
169. Brennan, 'A Fine Mixture of Pity and Justice:' The Criminal Justice Response to Infanticide in
Ireland 1922-1949, supra note 7, at 812-18, 823-27.
170. KRAMAR, supra note 104, at 69.
171. See supra § II.
172. See generally Brennan, Social Norms and the Law in Responding to Infanticide, supra note 8
(discussing the factors that led to the decline in this crime). See also infra note 194 and
accompanying text.
173. Ireland's strict abortion regime is a clear example of this. See supra note 35. However, even in
jurisdictions with more liberal laws, abortion may be subject to certain restrictions. For example,
in England and Wales, abortions performed outside of the scope of the Abortion Act, 1967, remain
punishable by up to a maximum of life imprisonment. Offences Against the Person Act of 1861
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sample occurred, it was not something that prevailing patriarchal ideologies
which centered on female virtue and the importance of the married family
could permit.
What infanticide law and sentencing shows is that although patriarchy
sought to retain control over all women's reproductive lives, occasionally some
women, such as those who committed infanticide, were "protected" from the
harshness of this system. I argue that ultimately this "compassion" was self-
serving because it helped patriarchy to maintain its grip. Like how mercy
functions to legitimize an otherwise unfair and harsh law, so too can it be said
that it served to legitimize patriarchy because compassionate treatment of the
infanticide offender made patriarchy appear less cruel and objectionable. In
other words, protecting those few exceptional women who committed
infanticide from the full extent of the criminal law did not grant any woman
autonomy over her private life. Rather, it helped the state to retain control over
all women's reproductive freedom and choices. As feminist legal scholars have
argued, the law is patriarchal in that it serves to maintain the interests of the
dominant patriarchal gender order. 174 Infanticide law and punishment is a good
example of this.
Related to the legitimating effect mercy had on patriarchy, lenient
punishment arguably helped to divert attention from this crime and its causes,
which also helped to maintain the patriarchal status quo. Arguably, if women
who killed newborn babies had been imprisoned for lengthy terms, this would
have drawn greater public attention to this crime, possibly generating debate
about the circumstances in which it was committed and the wider structural
factors that contributed to it, and leading to calls for legal and cultural reform.
A search of the Irish newspaper database, which covers both national and local
newspapers, for the period 1950-1975 showed that most of the cases in this
sample generated little or no media attention, particularly in circumstances
involving the typical concealed birth. Evidently, infanticide was
uncontroversial. However, if women had been given much harsher sentences,
this might not have been the case. For example, recent controversies which
have highlighted the dangerous and cruel effects of strict abortion laws have
helped direct attention to this issue, encourage public debate, and garner energy
for change.' 75 Although in the context of a more liberal society, it does
§§ 58, 59, 24 Vict. C. 10 (Eng.). See Sally Sheldon, The Decriminalisation of Abortion: An
Argument for Modernisation, 36 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 334 (2016).
174. See generally Janet Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 83
(1980); Smart, supra note 109.
175. There have been a number of high-profile controversial incidents in Ireland over the last few years,
starting with the death of Savita Halappanavar in 2012. See MAirdad Enright, Savita
Halappanavar: Ireland, Abortion and the Politics of Death and Grief CRITICAL LEGAL
THINKING: L. AND THE POL., Nov. 14, 2012, http://criticallegalthinking.com/2012/11/14/savita-
halappanavar-ireland-abortion-and-the-politics-of-death-and-grief/ [https:/perma.cc/8LF5-ZF65];
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demonstrate that where public attention is drawn to the reality of the impact of
harsh rules and laws, this may encourage reform. In this way, mercy allowed
patriarchy to continue uninterrupted by the controversy that may have arisen if
the worst effects of gender inequality and women's lack of reproductive
autonomy had been laid bare.
So, mercy towards infanticide offenders helped patriarchy to retain its
control over women's reproductive autonomy because it both minimized the
impact of the harshness of patriarchal values, laws and structures, and also
diverted attention from the crime and its causes. This is not to suggest,
however, that it was necessarily the role of the courts to challenge patriarchy or
to argue that if they had done so they would have been successful, though some
further points will be made on this in the conclusion. For now, the key point is
to highlight the link between mercy and patriarchy. In essence, compassionate
treatment of the infanticide offender operated on a systematic level as a
patriarchal "pressure valve." It allowed the state to continue to exercise control
over women's reproduction by showing the gentler side of patriarchy and
averting potential controversy. In this regard, compassion (paternalism) is a key
facet of patriarchy; paternalism helps to preserve patriarchy.
Finally, the above analysis is not to suggest that judges or anyone else
involved in lenient criminal justice practices, including those who enacted the
infanticide law, were consciously seeking to preserve patriarchal ideologies or
laws, or that they did not feel genuine sympathy for these offenders. For
example, documents consulted that related to the reform of the law on
infanticide during the 1940s show that humanitarian sentiment played an
important role in bringing about this legal change.17 6 However, as Smart notes,
the law is not an instrument for the exercise of male power whereby male
criminal justice actors seek to use the law for the benefit of men and against
women's interests.177 As Ballinger argues: "the state is patriarchal and the law
Shane Harrison, How Savita Halappanavar's Death Called Attention to Irish Abortion Law, BBC
NEWS, Apr. 19, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22204377 [https:// perma. cc
/6MEM-52JS]. This culminated in a Citizen's Assembly on the future of the constitutional
provision on abortion. See The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, CITIZENS' ASSEMBLY, Apr.
2017, https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/The-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/ [https://
perma.cc/5SWM-2XZP] (recommending that abortion should be available in Ireland in a wide
range of circumstances). See also Ronan McGreevy, Citizens' Assembly Backs Abortion Rights in
Wide Range of Circumstances, IRISH TIMES, Apr. 23, 2017, http://www.irishtimes.com/news
/ireland/irish-news/citizens-assembly-backs-abortion-rights-in-wide-range-of-circumstances-1.305
8170 [https://perma.cc/H9A3-L7U9]. Ireland repealed the Eighth Amendment by popular vote on
May 25, 2018, paving the way for a significant loosening of Ireland's abortion regime. Kimiko de
Freytas-Tamura, Ireland Votes. to End Abortion Ban, in Rebuke to Catholic Conservatism, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/26/world/europe/ireland-abortion-yes
.html [https://perma.cc/UA2T-737C]. For further detail on the current law on abortion in Ireland,
see supra note 54.
176. See Brennan, 'A Fine Mixture ofPity and Justice:' The Criminal Justice Response to Infanticide in
Ireland 1922-1949, supra note 7, at 829-33, 836-41.
177. Smart, supra note 109, at 137-44.
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is androcentric, but not in a simplistic, male-inspired conspiratorial sense.
Rather the state's role in women's oppression is subtle to the point where it
appears to be gender neutral-or even protective towards women-by
seemingly regulating the system to prevent further oppression."17 8 The
infanticide law and sentencing under it is a good example of how the law and
legal practice can sometimes benefit women offenders in ways that exclude
male offenders from similar benevolent inclinations. Further, it demonstrates
that compassion for the offender from individual criminal justice agents and the
preservation of patriarchal structures are not necessarily mutually exclusive; in
fact, it highlights how genuine individual sentiment towards infanticide
offenders functioned as a system to enable the state to preserve patriarchal
norms and structures.
CONCLUSION
So where does this leave us in terms of explaining and critiquing
punishment of women who killed their babies in Ireland in the 1950s and
1960s? Both approaches explored above-gender construction and
paternalism-highlight the link between punishment of women offenders,
particularly for gendered crimes such as infanticide, and the preservation of
patriarchy, the very structure that contributed to these crimes in the first place.
Gender construction theory critiques the way in which women offenders are
understood as being irrational, weak, and lacking in agency, and how this
serves to deny the structural causes of offending, thus helping maintain
patriarchy. Paternalism highlights the link between compassion and control-
the way mercy can function as a system to preserve patriarchy by showing that
it has a benevolent side and by diverting attention from the inequalities at hand.
In the infanticide case, paternalistic treatment of these offenders allowed the
state to retain control over women's reproduction.
Therefore, in seeking to explain lenient treatment of infanticide offenders,
gender construction theory and paternalism both reveal that lenience was a part
of patriarchy. It reflected patriarchal norms which viewed women as weak and
irrational, and served patriarchal interests, particularly with regard to denying
women reproductive autonomy. Ultimately, both theories show that lenient
sentencing, when it does not include an honest assessment of the mitigating
factors involved, especially structural inequality, is problematic because it can
serve to maintain such inequalities. On the face of it, then, it might be said that
mercy, whether understood as being informed by gender constructions or by
the exercise of paternalism, was bad for women because it helped to support
patriarchy.
178. Ballinger, supra note 3, at 474.
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Further, the fairness of prosecuting women for this crime in the first place
might also be queried because, when we consider the issue of where
responsibility lay for these infants' deaths, it is evident that society and the
state bore some of the fault. Ballinger argues that the notion that women who
killed their babies in the early twentieth-century in England were treated
leniently should be disputed. She states:
"The fact that all women who had killed their biological children were
reprieved .. . did not and could not demonstrate 'leniency.' . . . Instead we may
question the 'harshness' of punishment for this offence . . . thereby placing the
burden of structural and socio-economic shortcomings and inadequacies on the
shoulders of the very poorest and most powerless in society: individual women
who were denied the necessary means to keep their children alive."1 7 9
In other words, despite that cultural, social, economic, and legal structural
factors contributed to this crime, 180 the infanticide offender was the sole focus
of the criminal law. We should not, therefore, label the treatment of these
women as "lenient," but instead challenge that they were the target of the
criminal law in the first place.
In this regard, West has argued that patriarchy causes harm to women,
especially in the context of sexuality and reproduction, with unwanted
pregnancy being an instance of such "gendered harm."181 The law/the state can
play a part in reinforcing and perpetuating "gendered harms." 18 2 In the context
at hand, patriarchal norms and values, which were embedded in various legal
provisions and in the Irish state's approach to unmarried mothers, caused harm
to women. While it may be unduly facile to say that structural inequality
automatically leads to offending, it is certainly evident that there was a causal
link between the inequality this offender experienced, particularly with regard
to her reproductive choices, and infanticide. Looking at infanticide from this
perspective, it is possible to see that the harm caused to the baby by its mother
was a consequence of the "gendered harm" caused to her by patriarchy, and the
state's adoption of patriarchal values in its laws and policies. The state,
therefore, bears some responsibility for this crime. By criminalizing women,
the state arguably further compounded the harm to these mothers by holding
them solely responsible for their babies' deaths.
179. BALLINGER, supra note 111, at 73.
180. Supra § II.
181. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 165 (1997).
182. Sheelagh McGuinness & Ruth Fletcher, Attorney General v. X: Feminist Judgment and
Commentary, in NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: JUDGES' TROUBLES AND THE
GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY (2017), https://research-information.bristol.ac.uk/files
/79347730/18_AG vX.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R7T-TUFA]; Joanne Conaghan, Gendered Harms
and the Law of Tort: Remedying (Sexual) Harassment, 16 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 407, 407-408,
427-31 (1996).
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The recent discovery of "significant quantities of human remains" of
babies and children, aged between 35 gestational weeks and two/three years
and buried between the 1920s and 1950s in an unmarked grave at the site of a
former Mother and Baby Home in Tuam, Co. Galway, reinforces this point.1 8 3
The discovery was made following partial excavation of the site by a
Commission of Investigation established in 2015 to investigate procedures and
practices related to a number of issues, including deaths and burials, at several
Mother and Baby Homes around the country. 18 4 The Commission was set up in
the aftermath of the controversy surrounding the findings of an amateur
historian who, prompted by local rumors of a mass unmarked grave at the
Tuam site, traced the death certificates for 796 children who had died there
between 1925 and 1961, but was unable to obtain burial records for all but two
cases. 18 5
Although there is no suggestion that these children died by violent means,
questions have been raised about whether systematic neglect played a part.
As Fischer has noted more generally, "there is evidence of harsh, if not
183. For a report on findings following partial excavation of the site, see Notice Third March 2017,
MOTHER AND BABY HOMES COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.mbhcoi.ie/MBH.nsf
/page/Latest/o2ONews-en [https://perma.cc/ML6J-KUGF]. The skeletal remains were found in an
underground chamber whose original purpose may have been sewerage or wastewater disposal,
but it is unclear whether it had ever been used for such a purpose.
184. See What Is the Mother and Baby Homes Commission of Investigation?, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 3,
2017, http://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/what-is-the-mother-and-baby-homes-
commission-of-investigation-1.2996729 [https://perma.cc/XG6P-NA9JJ. Among the topics to be
examined by the Mother and Baby Homes Commission of Investigation are: the living conditions
and care arrangements of mothers and babies at the homes under review; the mortality among
mothers and children at these institutions and the causes, circumstances, and rates of mortality; and
the post-mortem procedures in place, including the reporting of deaths and burial arrangements.
Commission of Investigation (Mother and Baby Homes and Certain Related Matters) Order 2015,
Statutory Instrument number 57 of 2015.
185. For more information, see Shane Harrison, Tuam Mother and Baby Home 'Chamber ofHorrors'
Irish PM, BBC NEWS, Mar. 7, 2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39192744 [https://
perma.cc/7LT4-FTEQ]; Conall 6 FAtharta & Fiachra 6 Cionnaith, 'Signficant Quantities' of
Child Remains Found at Tuam Site, IRISH EXAMINER, Mar. 4, 2017, https://www.irishexaminer
.com/breakingnews/ireland/significant-quantities-of-child-remains-confirmed-at-tuam-site-779947
.html [https://perma.cc/AA8G-EU38]; Jamie Grierson & Agencies in Dublin, Mass Grave of
Babies and Children Found at Tuam Care Home in Ireland, GUARDIAN, Mar. 3, 2017, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/03/mass-grave-of-babies-and-children-found-at-tuam-
orphanage-in-ireland [https://perma.cc/S3CP-RDT5]; Human Remains Found at Tuam Former
Mother-and-Baby Home, RTE, Mar. 3, 2017, https://www.rte.ie/news/2017/0303/856914-tuam-
mother-baby/ [https://perma.cc/CN57-SAMH].
186. For views on whether a criminal investigation is likely, see Alan O'Keeffe & Sarah MacDonald,
Criminal Investigation in Mother and Baby Home 'Graves' is Likely, IRISH INDEP., Mar. 6, 2017,
https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/criminal-investigation-into-mother-and-baby-home-graves-
is-likely-35504497.html [https://perma.cc/WLM3-6D2Q]; Cormac O'Keeffe et al., Tuam: No
Evidence of Crime, Nobody to Prosecute, IRISH EXAMINER, Mar. 6, 2017, https://www
.irishexaminer.com/ireland/tuam-no-evidence-of-crime-nobody-to-prosecute-444513.html [https://
perma.cc/486H-TRCBJ.
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extremely abusive, treatment of those kept in religious institutions of 'care."'l
87
The Commission of Investigation, whose terms of reference include
investigating the causes, circumstances and rates of mortality of women and
children at the institutions within its purview, 18 is due to report on its findings
in February 2019. For now, the most that can be said is that, irrespective of
how these babies died, the discovery at the site of the former Tuam Mother and
Baby Home is indicative of Irish attitudes to "illegitimate" children, including
the circumstances of their lives and deaths, in the early to middle years of the
twentieth century. Given how little the state, the law, and wider society cared
about the fate of illegitimate children, 18 9 the pursuance of homicide charges
against women who killed their babies at birth should be contested. It
highlights the unfairness and hypocrisy of a system which blamed individual
women for a crime that wider society had "antecedently much to answer
for." 19 0
The impact of criminalization on individual women was, however,
somewhat alleviated by the infanticide law and sentencing practice under it. In
this regard, the authority of both the patriarchal structures involved and of the
criminal law to criminalize and punish in these circumstances, and particularly
to lay fault solely on the individual woman, was essentially legitimized by
merciful treatment which allowed women to be convicted of a less serious
homicide offense and essentially avoid punishment. As Norrie has argued, the
criminal law plays a political function in that it keeps social conflicts,
particularly class based inequality between rich and poor and the fact that the
criminal law is used primarily by the former against the latter, out of the
courtroom.19 1 The Infanticide Act and sentencing under it certainly kept the
conflicts created by patriarchy away from the courtroom, first by ostensibly
pathologizing this offender, blaming the crime on her individual vulnerability,
and, second, through merciful treatment which served to further divert attention
from her crime and its causes. Indeed, not only did the law and practice in these
Irish infanticide cases serve to keep the conflicts of patriarchy out of the
courtroom, and to disguise the unfairness of targeting these women for
criminalization in the first place, it also helped to sustain unfair and unequal
patriarchal structures outside of that context.
187. Fischer, supra note 43, at 827. This comment is not restricted to mother and baby institutions but
also to Magdalene asylums and industrial and reformatory schools.
188. Commission of Investigation (Mother and Baby Homes and Certain Related Matters) Order 2015,
Statutory Instrument number 57 of 2015, schedule (1) II, III, IV.
189. See generally MOIRA J. MAGUIRE, PRECARIOUS CHILDHOOD IN POST INDEPENDENT IRELAND
(2009).
190. Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 476 (1866)).
Rev. Ld. S. G. Osborne made this comment when giving evidence before the Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment in 1866.
191. Norrie, supra note 6, at 223-25.
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The question that then arises is: what is the appropriate criminal justice
response to infanticide? Given the circumstances involved, and, in particular,
the role of patriarchy, should women who conceal their pregnancies and kill
their babies at a secret birth not be subject to the criminal law? Or, should the
wider context serve to mitigate the crime, and, if so, what should this
mitigation be based on-the reality of socio-political inequality, or a gender
construction that masks the role of patriarchal values, laws and structures, as
well as other socio-political inequality, in the commission of the offense? The
question of whether the offense should be subject to the criminal law is too
complex to address here, so I will limit my conclusions to the matter of
mitigation. The following discussion has meaning not only to the Irish
experience, but also to how other jurisdictions, including but not solely those
with similar infanticide statutes,1 92 treat women who kill their newborn or
young babies.
The analysis in Sections IV and V above highlights that mercy towards
infanticide offenders can help to maintain patriarchy by allowing the state to
retain control over women's reproduction, and how a construction of the
offender that reflects stereotypical views of women as being mentally unstable
denies the structural causes of offending, which also serves patriarchal
interests. In the end, the criminal justice response helps preserve the patriarchal
status quo. However, while mercy and gender constructions may be criticized,
the question arises as to whether we should abandon these approaches.
Although mercy towards the Irish infanticide offender in the 1950s through to
the early 1970s helped the state retain control of all women's reproduction, we
wouldn't necessarily want vulnerable women to have suffered more
punishment simply to have provoked a challenge to patriarchal rules. Further,
as discussed above gender constructions that deny the offender's agency, while
not ideal, are, when we take the wider context of the criminal law into account,
an unfortunate necessity, and, in the context of the Irish infanticide law and
practice, allowed for an imperfect contextualization of her crime with minimal
criminalization.19 3 As argued in section IV, unless we challenge one of the core
theoretical foundations of the criminal law, namely that the socio-political
context of offending is irrelevant to ascribing criminal liability and punishing,
it seems it would be impossible to provide for lenient treatment without in
some way highlighting the offender's lack of agency. In some respects,
therefore, flawed as the approach may have been from a theoretical
192. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American Infanticide,
34 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1 (1996-19-97) (discussing how women accused of killing their babies are
treated in different jurisdictions across the United States, and highlighting disparate criminal
justice responses-ranging from very lenient to very harsh disposals-in cases with -similar facts).
193. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
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perspective, the Infanticide Act and the punishment regime that operated under
it was the best outcome for the cases in this sample.
However, given the undesirable implications of this for women's equality
and rights, it is argued that a preferable outcome would involve something very
different. As is evident from this study of infanticide sentencing in Ireland,
mercy coupled with a failure to openly address the contribution of patriarchal
values and laws to infanticide is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it is
unfair to individual offenders who, even if they were leniently punished, still
officially bear sole blame for the crime. Second, it is unfair to women in
general because it helps facilitate the continuation of structures that deny them
reproductive autonomy and choices around motherhood. Finally, it is unfair to
potential victims because, in allowing the causes of infanticide to remain
unchecked, it does nothing to help prevent future crimes.
This brings us to the relationship between structural equality, including in
the case of infanticide having genuine and supported reproductive choices,
criminal offending, the prevention of crime, and the role of courts. In the
context of infanticide, there are two desired goals, in addition to ensuring fair
treatment of women who commit this crime. First, from a crime prevention
perspective, the reduction or elimination of infanticide. Second, from a
woman's equality perspective, the realization of the principle that women
should have full reproductive autonomy, including the ability to have children
outside of marriage without the risk of cultural stigmatization, and the
opportunity for all mothers to benefit from adequate support of a financial,
emotional, and practical nature. These goals are not mutually exclusive. As
noted in Section II, infanticide, especially of newborn infants, was inextricably
linked to structural inequality and the denial of reproductive autonomy for Irish
women during the period under review in this study. It is no coincidence that,
as Irish society began to slowly liberalize and as women gained more equality
and better reproductive options in the late 1960s/early 1970s, but particularly
from the 1980s onwards, infanticide as a crime virtually disappeared from Irish
criminal statistics. 19 4 Drawing on this experience, it seems that what is needed
to prevent, or at least reduce, infanticide is not harsh punishment of offenders,
but structural reform. I do not mean to claim that structural changes would
wholly eradicate infanticide, as undoubtedly there are other factors that can
lead to this crime. However, I do suggest that if women can choose, without
negative economic, social and personal consequences, whether to be mothers
and in what circumstances, and without the expectation that the ideal context in
which to do this is within the married family, this would go a long way towards
preventing infanticide.
194. See Shane Kilcommins, supra note 56, at 117 (arguing that the decline in infanticide reflects the
changed social and moral environment, particularly the fact that giving birth outsider of marriage
no longer attracts a significant social stigma and the risk of institutionalization).
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The fact that infanticide, particularly of newborn babies, has largely
disappeared from Irish criminal statistics and is no longer prosecuted does not
make this point redundant. First, although there has been a significant decline
in infanticide over recent decades, this does not mean that this crime will never
occur again, and while women have made important gains in terms of
reproductive rights, much more needs to be achieved, not least in relation to
abortion.1 95 Second, although the Irish criminal authorities have, since the mid-
1980s, tended not to prosecute cases of infanticide, this does not mean that
women will never again be the subject of criminal proceedings for this offense.
Indeed, as I argue elsewhere, the criminal justice response to infanticide in
Ireland during the twentieth and into the twenty-first century was informed by
social norms about the appropriate response to this crime. As these norms shift,
so too can we expect criminal justice agents, namely the Garda and
prosecutors, to adapt their approach to this offender.' 9 6 Further, the fact that the
criminal authorities have tended to avoid prosecuting the rare cases of
infanticide that have come to their attention over the last few decades is itself
possibly another example of well-meant but ultimately problematic lenient
treatment of women who kill their babies. Again, attention is diverted from the
crime, and questions about why it would continue to occur, albeit infrequently,
in a more liberal country where women supposedly can prevent pregnancy or
chose to be mothers outside of marriage, are potentially suppressed.
Finally, the argument made here about the link between lenient treatment
of women who kill their babies and the preservation of patriarchal structures,
and the suggestion that a more honest appraisal of criminal responsibility that
takes account of the role of structural factors rooted in gender inequality would
be preferable, has resonance beyond the Irish context. Although it is outside the
scope of this Article to explore the extent of infanticide in other jurisdictions or
its causes, it is not untrue to say that this is a crime that has not disappeared
entirely from Western society. 197 Further, it is probably fair to say that where
infanticide does occur it continues to be rooted in patriarchal attitudes to
women and related ideas about appropriate motherhood, alongside wider issues
of gender and other socio-political inequality. This is true whether the crime
195. See supra notes 54, 175.
196. See generally, Brennan, Social Norms and the Law in Responding to Infanticide, supra note 8.
197. For an example of a study of contemporary infanticide in America, see Oberman, supra note 192.
See also Mackay's study for the Law Commission in England and Wales in its 2006 report on
homicide, in which he identifies 49 infanticide convictions over the period from 1990 to 2003; this
number did not include women who killed their babies but who were convicted of other offenses.
Ronald D. Mackay, Infanticide and Related Diminished Responsibility Manslaughters: An
Empirical Study, in MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER AND INFANTICIDE 193, app. D (Law Commission
2006).
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involves newborn or older babies.198 Certainly women in many Western
societies have made significant advances in terms of equality and their
reproductive rights since the 1960s (e.g., through medical advances in birth
control and the legalization of contraception; social welfare payments to
unmarried mothers; greater cultural acceptability of having children outside of
marriage; and in some cases, access to abortion). However, there still remain
significant areas of patriarchal control of women's reproduction, and women
face many barriers and difficulties in relation to their choices around
motherhood (such as restrictions on abortion, poor sex education, lack of
access to contraception, lingering social disapprobation of "single mothers,"
lack of wider social support for new mothers, the burden of child-care falling
largely on women, and unaffordable child-care).
As Meyer and Oberman have argued, "[i]nfanticide is not a random
unpredictable crime. Instead it is deeply imbedded in and is a reflection of the
societies in which it occurs. The crime of infanticide is committed by mothers
who cannot parent their child under the circumstances dictated by their unique
position in place and time." 199 Although, as already stated, it would be overly
simplistic to claim that structural inequality automatically leads to crime,
historically it has certainly been a very potent factor in the case of infanticide;
it would be unsurprising if this continued to be the case, despite advances in
women's rights since the mid-twentieth century. Arguably, then, one way to
prevent or at least reduce infanticide is structural reform which grants women
full reproductive autonomy and which provides mothers with social and other
support. This would include access to contraception, sex education and
abortion services; a cultural shift in attitude towards unmarried mothers which
would destigmatize those who give birth outside of the patriarchal family; a
strong social safety net with decent welfare support for women and their
children; and well-paid job opportunities with affordable childcare.
This brings us to the role the courts. Criminal courts, one function of which
is arguably to prevent crime, may have a part to play in drawing attention to the
198. See generally MICHELLE OBERMAN & CHERYL L. MEYER, WHEN MOTHERS KILL: INTERVIEWS
FROM PRISON (2008). In this study, which was based on interviews with eight women convicted of
child homicide offences in the US involving newborn and older children, Oberman and Meyer
highlight the importance of social support for mothers in helping to prevent filicide (a term that
would include children over one year-infanticide as a term is limited to infants), stating: "The
absence of support is a constant factor underlying the various categories of mothers who kill their
children.. .. At their core, the stories of mothers who kill their children are stories about isolation,
and the struggle to be a parent in the absence of a reliable community." Id. at 131. They also
highlight the role of cultural assumptions about motherhood, which expect women to "cope with
and indeed revel in motherhood," something which makes it difficult for women to admit to the
difficulties of mothering and ask for help. They add, "[h]erein lies the most significant roadblock
to preventing infanticide: the lack of nonjudgmental resources for mothers and children." Id. at
137.
199. CHERYL L. MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR CHILDREN:
UNDERSTANDING ACTS OF MOMS FROM SUSAN SMITH TO THE "PROM MOM" 2 (2001).
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structural causes of infanticide. Having a more honest conversation in the
courtroom about why women kill their babies, including the contribution of
patriarchy and related gender inequality, may prompt a wider discussion about
what should be done at a structural level to prevent infanticide. However, as
noted, the limitations imposed on the courts by criminal law doctrines, even
with the wider interpretation taken of the mental disturbance rationale in
Infanticide Acts, 2 0 0 make it difficult for them to engage with the wider socio-
political causes of offending, especially on the question of the attribution of
criminal liability. Further, there may be no scope to do this in cases where
women plead guilty, which many of the accused in this Irish sample did.20 '
Yet, depending on how constrained judges are by the sentencing
framework, there may be some space around discussions on punishment to
engage in a more honest conversation about the structural causes of the offense.
This would not necessarily mean denying individual responsibility, rather that
it may be located within the context of gender inequality, lack of reproductive
choice, poverty, and other structural causes of the crime. Further, where
sentencing rules allow for flexibility, for example in taking account of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it may be possible to appropriately
mitigate the offender's responsibility without recourse to false gender
constructions, leading to fairer punishment of the offender. In addition, as
suggested, an open confrontation with the socio-political causes of this offense
in the courtroom may attract wider public attention, particularly from the
media, politicians, and policy and lawmakers, possibly stimulating discussions
about why women kill their babies, and encouraging an agenda for structural
reform. Any subsequent structural reform would benefit all women in their
choices around motherhood, and, consequently, reduce the crime of infanticide.
In conclusion, in any jurisdiction where structural factors play an important
role in the commission of infanticide offenses, these factors should be openly
acknowledged. If infanticidal women are to be criminalized, the criminal
justice system should not add further to the "gendered harm" these women
have already experienced.20 2 Further, prevention of infanticide and equality for
women go hand in hand, and neither will be achieved by viewing this crime
through false constructs which either deny or emphasize rationality because, in
both instances, the structural causes are ignored. Thus, where possible, the
courts should strive to highlight the link between gender inequality and
infanticide and should be willing to openly take the relationship into account in
sentencing as part of the mitigation for the crime.
200. See supra note 101.
201. At least 22 of the 31 women convicted of infanticide in Ireland since 1950 pleaded guilty to that
offense. Brennan, Social Norms and the Law in Responding to Infanticide, supra note 8.
202. WEST, supra note 181.
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I do not doubt that this is a contentious argument to make, given the
criminal law's deeply ingrained individualized approach to assigning and
punishing criminal responsibility. There would be problems, of course, in
getting judges to recognize the non-individualized causes of infanticide, to
accept that these should play a legitimate role in how offenders are understood
and punished, and to openly admit to the role of such factors in sentencing
decisions. More importantly, they are likely to be hindered by norms and rules
in sentencing practice which mean that socio-political factors can be of limited
or no relevance. Nonetheless, as this study of infanticide in Ireland
demonstrates, where a crime is embedded in structural inequality, lenient
treatment of the offender that fails to openly acknowledge the role of those
inequalities not only helps to preserve the laws, values, and norms that
contributed to the crime in the first instance, but also allows such factors to
remain hidden and so does nothing to help prevent future crimes. In other
words, even if, at the end of the day, women who kill their babies are leniently
sentenced, it is imperative that courts do more to identify and engage with the
wider socio-political context of the crime; to acknowledge, where appropriate,
that these factors mitigate the crime; and to at least initiate a conversation about
why women kill their babies.
This study of infanticide provides a good illustration of how crime should
not be isolated from its structural causes, and how offenders should not be
understood as one-dimensional constructs, whether they are "mad/sad/bad"
women, or rational abstract men. The lessons from this infanticide study are
particularly instructive in highlighting the shortcomings of the criminal law,
particularly when structural inequality is one of the root causes of crime, and so
may offer insights into the approach to be taken to other offenders, notably
where the crime they commit is unambiguously embedded in socio-political
inequality, whether this is due to gender, race, or class. It also shines a light on
the role of the courts, especially during sentencing, in trying to understand
criminal offenders in a more sophisticated way so as to ensure that, if
individuals are to be blamed and punished for their offenses, that this also takes
account of wider socio-political factors, and, where appropriate, such factors
should be worthy of consideration in mitigation. In so doing, the courts will
arguably reach fairer outcomes for individual offenders, without disguising the
role of unequal social and political structures, and possibly in this way help
challenge wider injustice and reduce crime.
What is needed, therefore, is a reorientation of the criminal law away from
a decontextualized allocation of responsibility. I do not underestimate not only
the controversial nature of this suggestion, but also the complexity of issues it
gives rise to. As such, it is suggested that as a starting point we, academics,
lawyers, judges, politicians, and the public, should have a conversation about
the merits, risks, and other implications, good or bad, of taking a more
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contextualized approach to criminal offending. Some factors that could be
considered are whether the socio-political context should be relevant only to
certain kinds of crimes (such as those where, as with infanticide, the crime is
clearly embedded in unequal structures and where there is an evident desire to
treat the offender more leniently as a consequence), or could be claimed by all
offenders; whether structural factors should be taken into account in attributing
criminal responsibility, or only as mitigation in punishment, or both; if the
criminal law did shift towards taking account of such factors, what limits, if
any, should be placed on this, and, in particular, how this should be balanced
against other factors like protecting the public and vindicating victims' rights.

